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I. INTRODUCTION
Julia was twelve years old when she last saw her family. She was
walking home from school in Russia when three men abducted her, took her
to Moscow, and flatly told her she would be engaging in prostitution. At her
first attempted escape, one of her abductors slashed her cheek with a knife to
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let her know that if she failed to cooperate, she would lose her life. For
seven years, Julia was raped, subjected to forced labor, and injected with
drugs on a regular basis. Julia suffered under those conditions until she was
nineteen years old, when she finally escaped with the help of an aid agency.1
Suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,2 Julia could not bear living
in Russia and used fraudulent papers obtained from a friend to enter the
United States. Julia hoped to remain in the United States, fearing that if
deported to Russia, her abductors would track her down and put her back in
the brothel, or kill her.3
Amare was twelve years old when he witnessed his parents being shot
and killed by gang members burglarizing his house in Ethiopia. One year
after Amare moved into an orphanage, he was abducted by armed militia and
taken to an army base. The militia told him that they would provide him
with food and shelter and that he would be helping rid the country of the
gang responsible for his parents’ murder. Amare’s captors made him think
that he was obliged to be a soldier for his own protection. Amare and his
peers were first assigned to carry heavy loads, such as ammunition or injured
soldiers. When a friend of Amare’s was too weak to carry his load, he was
shot. Amare knew that death would be his fate as well if he failed to
properly follow instructions. Amare’s duties also included standing guard,
watching prisoners who were dying of heat and malnutrition, and preventing
them from escaping. After four years of subjugating others to tortuous
conditions against his will, Amare was able to escape when his commanders
sent him to gather food. Amare feared being captured and killed or forced to
return to his former conditions if he stayed in the country, so with the help of
his cousin in America, he entered the United States.4

1. According to Alexander Krasnov of Russia’s Interior Ministry Police, the Russian police “do
what they can” to fight prostitution by raiding brothels, but are unable to address the root of the
problem. Matthew Chance, Russia’s Sex Slave Industry Thrives, Rights Groups Say, CNN WORLD
(July 18, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/18/russia.prostitution/index.html.
“[W]e still don’t have a basic law that defines victims’ rights. At the moment, it’s mostly aid
agencies that deal with [alleviating the problem of forced prostitution].” Id.
2. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) results when a person suffers from a traumatic event
that is outside the realm of typical human experiences. DAVID KINCHIN, POST TRAUMATIC STRESS
DISORDER: THE INVISIBLE INJURY 2 (2005). PTSD can result from a near death experience, as well
as from sexual abuse. Id. PTSD has led to frequent suicide attempts among victims of human
trafficking. Jonathan Wald, Sex Slavery: A Family Business, THE CNN FREEDOM PROJECT (Mar. 4,
2011), http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/04/sex-slavery-a-family-business/.
3. While this description does not represent a specific person, it is a hypothetical situation
typical of many girls who are victims of human trafficking in Russia and other countries. See infra
Part IV.
4. While this description does not represent a specific person, it is a hypothetical situation
typical of many children in Ethiopia and other countries who are forced to be child soldiers. See
infra Part IV.
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Upon entering the country, Julia and Amare applied for asylum. United
States asylum law seeks to prevent the return of undocumented foreign
nationals to their home countries if doing so may put them in danger of
being persecuted by their government, or by a source that their government
is unable or unwilling to control.5 However, under the current law, Julia and
Amare would likely be deported to their home countries where they endured
persecution, despite their governments’ inability to protect them.6 In order
to qualify for asylum, an applicant must show, among other things,7
persecution on one of five grounds: race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.8 For victims of human
trafficking and former child soldiers, the only viable ground to claim is that
they are members of particular social groups.9 In order to qualify as a social
group, the group must not have been created by its persecutor.10 Victims of
human trafficking and child soldiers have such labels due to their
persecutor’s actions; they would not fall under such categories but for their
persecutors abducting them. Thus, victims of human trafficking and child
soldiers may be denied classification as members of particular social groups,
and consequently, asylum.11
This Comment explains that under the current case law, “victims of
human trafficking” and “former child soldiers” are unlikely to be found as
particular social groups because their persecutors created the groups.12 This
Comment argues that “women from (a given country)” and “children from (a
given country)” are valid social groups under which victims of human
trafficking and child soldiers, respectively, may claim asylum.13 There are
circuit splits, as well as conflicting holdings within circuits, as to whether
gender and youth can define social groups.14 In addition to the social group
obstacle, this Comment explains how child soldiers face the unique barrier

5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part V.
7. A successful asylum claim requires that the applicant show past persecution, or a wellfounded fear of future persecution, committed by the government or a source that the government is
unable or unwilling to control. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra notes 170–71, 227 and accompanying text.
10. Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[A] social group may not be
circularly defined by the fact that it suffers persecution.”). See also infra Part III for a detailed
discussion of the requirements for a group to qualify as a social group for purposes of asylum.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Part VI.
14. See infra Part V.
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of the persecutor’s bar.15 The persecutor’s bar states that an applicant may
not be granted asylum if the applicant has persecuted others.16 Until
recently, judges have applied the persecutor’s bar in denying asylum,
regardless of whether an applicant’s persecutory acts were made under
coercion.17 A recent case, Negusie v. Holder,18 may change the direction of
this law in holding that involuntary persecution may be exempt from the
persecutor’s bar.19 This Comment argues for a middle ground between preNegusie and post-Negusie law: that coerced persecution is still subject to the
persecutor’s bar, except as applied towards children.20
Part II of this Comment summarizes the background of asylum and
refugee law, the elements required to qualify for asylum, as well as the
alternatives to asylum.21 Part III details how to determine if a group
qualifies as a social group.22 Part IV discusses the conditions for victims of
human trafficking and child soldiers in different countries.23 Part V
describes the current state of the law in granting asylum to victims of human
trafficking and former child soldiers and explains the persecutor’s bar.24
Part VI analyzes options for granting asylum to victims of human trafficking
and child soldiers.25 It dissects the discrepancies in granting asylum to such
groups, explains circuit splits, discusses which lines of thought are most
sound, and explains the impact that Negusie26 has had on the application of
the persecutor’s bar towards former child soldiers. It also sets out three
proposals: for courts to acknowledge “women” as a social group,27 for courts
to allow “youth” to define a social group,28 and for the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA), upon hearing Negusie on remand, to find that voluntariness
should not be relevant to the persecutor’s bar as applied to adults, but should
be a factor when applied to children.29 Part VII considers the impact of the
proposals that this Comment sets forth and possible repercussions for
maintaining the status quo.30 Part VIII concludes the Comment.31

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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See infra notes 158–266 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 158–266 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 249–59 and accompanying text.
129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
See infra notes 158–266 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 384−399 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 32−103 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 104–32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 133–57 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 158–280 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 281–399 and accompanying text.
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
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II. ASYLUM AND REFUGEE LAW
A. The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
International efforts to help refugees began taking shape at the end of
World War I.32 After several treaties and organizations formed and were
then replaced, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) was established in 1951.33 Soon thereafter, the UNHCR
convened to form a treaty concerning refugees: The 1951 United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.34 This treaty defines a
refugee as a person residing outside his or her country of nationality, who is
unable or unwilling to return because of a “well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.”35 Since the treaty’s adoption,
approximately seventy-five percent of the world’s countries have signed the
1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol (collectively, the Convention).36
Included in the Convention is the doctrine of nonrefoulement,37 forbidding
states from returning refugees to a country where they may be persecuted on
account of one of the five protected grounds.38
In 1967, the United States signed the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, thereby acceding to the provisions of the Convention.39 However,
because the Convention is not “self-executing,”40 the United States must

31. See infra notes 431–36 and accompanying text.
32. DAVID A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 34 (2007).
33. The first High Commissioner for Refugees was appointed in 1921. Id. His office assisted
many groups displaced by World War I in settling abroad. Id. Several treaties soon followed,
providing a framework for international protection for refugees. Id. World War II triggered a
stronger movement; in 1943, the Allies created the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Id.
at 36. This was followed by the International Refugee Organization in 1947, which was replaced by
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1951. Id. at 36−37. Today,
the UNHCR has over 6000 staff members working in over one hundred countries. Id. at 38.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 39. These five grounds will hereinafter be referred to as “the five protected grounds.”
36. Id. at 9.
37. “Refoulement” is a French term referring to the return of refugees to persecution. Id. at 70.
38. Id.
39. Robert J. Williams, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council and Its Aftermath: A Problematic Gap
in International Immigration Law, 9 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 55, 68 (1995).
40. A treaty is “self-executing” when ratification of the treaty alone implements its provisions.
Id. at 57 n.21 (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 155 (1993)).
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pass legislation in order to give effect to the treaty’s terms.41 When
Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, the United States came into line
with the obligations set forth in the substantive provisions of the Convention
by incorporating its provisions into Congress’s Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA).42 Although there remain subtle differences between the
provisions in the Convention and those in the INA,43 most of the portions of
the United States legislation applicable to this Comment are in line with the
international treaty.
B. United States Asylum Provisions
There are three categories of asylum applicants in the United States:
those filing affirmative applications,44 those filing defensive applications,45
and those at ports of entry.46 An immigration judge (IJ) provides the initial
evaluation of defensive applications for asylum and a second review of
affirmative applications not granted by asylum officers.47 When an IJ does
not grant an asylum application, it is appealable to the BIA.48 When the BIA
rules against a claim, the applicant may appeal the removal order to the
federal courts of appeal.49
In order for an applicant to successfully claim asylum, the applicant
must establish three elements. First, the applicant must prove either past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.50 Second, the
persecution must have been or is expected to be committed by a proper

41. Id. See also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 491 (2008) (“While a treaty may constitute an
international commitment, it is not binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes
implementing it or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on
that basis.”).
42. MARTIN, supra note 32, at 72–73. The INA was first drafted by the United States Congress
in 1952. Id. at 72.
43. Id. at 73.
44. Affirmative applications are filed by those who are not currently in removal proceedings.
Id. at 79. When an applicant files an affirmative application, the applicant receives an interview
with an asylum officer to be conducted in a “nonadversarial” manner. Id. Asylum officers grant
meritorious cases and refer the remaining cases to removal proceedings in immigration court. Id.
45. An applicant files a defensive application for asylum if removal proceedings are already
underway. Id.
46. Id. at 78.
47. Id. at 81.
48. Id. at 83. The BIA is an administrative appeals tribunal and is part of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review in the Department of Justice. Id.
49. Id. at 85. A circuit court hearing a case on appeal must accord substantial deference, known
as Chevron deference, to the BIA’s interpretations of statutes and regulations. Capric v. Ashcroft,
355 F.3d 1075, 1085 n.4 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)).
50. Sanz de Santamaria v. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(1) (2008)). See also infra notes 53–67 and accompanying text.
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source: either the government or forces that the government is unwilling or
unable to control.51 Lastly, the past or future persecution must have been or
is expected to be motivated by one of the five protected grounds as a
“central reason.”52
Neither the Convention nor the INA have defined the key concept of
persecution, but the Ninth Circuit has defined it as “the infliction of
suffering or harm . . . in a way regarded as offensive.”53 If an applicant
successfully shows past persecution, he or she “creates a rebuttable
The
presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.”54
government can rebut this presumption if the country’s conditions have
changed such that it is now safe for the applicant to move back to his home
country.55 In determining whether an alien has suffered past persecution, the
immigration judge (IJ) must consider the cumulative effect of the allegedly

51. Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2000). See also infra notes 68–70 and
accompanying text.
52. The five protected grounds are race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and social group.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). See also infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
53. MARTIN, supra note 32, at 97. No subjective intent to harm is required for a finding of
persecution. See Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The fact that a persecutor
believes the harm he is inflicting is ‘good for’ his victim does not make it any less painful to the
victim, or, indeed, remove the conduct from the statutory definition of persecution.”).
54. Sanz de Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1007 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)).
55. Id. The burden of proof is on the government to rebut the applicant’s presumed wellfounded fear of future persecution by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, either changed
country conditions, or that the applicant could avoid future persecution by reasonably relocating
within the country. Id.; see also MARTIN, supra note 32, at 438. For the government to show
changed country conditions, it must conduct an individualized analysis focusing on the specific harm
inflicted on the applicant and the relevant information contained in the country reports. Chand v.
INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). General changes within the country are not sufficient.
Id.; see also Hanna v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2007). In Hanna, the applicant was a
citizen of Iraq who, among other incidents, was captured and tortured due to accusations that he was
anti-government. Hanna, 506 F.3d at 936. The BIA held that since Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath
party were no longer in power, the applicant’s fear of future persecution no longer existed. Id. at
937. When coalition forces took over control of Iraq, the circumstances in the country had changed
such that the applicant no longer had an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution and was
rendered ineligible for asylum. Id. If a government successfully proves that the applicant can safely
return to his or her country, the applicant may still be eligible for humanitarian asylum if the asylum
seeker establishes brutally severe past persecution amounting to a compelling reason to be unwilling
to return. Belishta v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004); see also 8 C.F.R. §
1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A) (2010). “This avenue for asylum has been reserved for rare situations of
‘atrocious’ persecution, where the alien establishes that, regardless of any threat of future
persecution, the circumstances surrounding the past persecution were so unusual and severe that he
is unable to return to his home country.” Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999).
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persecutory incidents.56 In the alternative, if the applicant opts to show a
well-founded fear of future persecution not based on past persecution, he or
she must demonstrate both subjective and objective components.57 The
subjective component can be satisfied by the applicant’s credible testimony
evidencing a genuine fear of persecution.58 Factors that may be considered
in determining credibility include demeanor,59 responsiveness,60 detail,61
inconsistencies,62 government reports,63 counterfeit documents,64 and

56. Delgado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 861 (11th Cir. 2007). Some incidents that have
been found to individually show past persecution are extreme physical violence, rape, and torture.
See Chand, 222 F.3d at 1073–74 (“Physical harm has consistently been treated as persecution.”); see
also Li v. Holder, 559 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009).
57. Sanz de Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1007 (“The applicant may prove eligibility by
demonstrating . . . a subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable fear of persecution.”).
58. Id. Deference is given to an IJ’s credibility determination as he is in the best position to
assess the trustworthiness of the applicant’s testimony. Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 661
(9th Cir. 2003). The substantial evidence standard is used to review adverse credibility findings.
Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009).
59. Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that applicant “began to
literally jump around in his seat and to squirm rather uncomfortably while testifying”). However,
boilerplate demeanor findings are not appropriate. Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1048,
1051–52 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Cookie cutter credibility findings are the antithesis of the individualized
determination required in asylum cases.”).
60. “To support an adverse credibility determination based on unresponsiveness, the BIA must
identify . . . instances . . . where the petitioner refused to answer questions.” Singh v. Ashcroft, 301
F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002).
61. Singh-Kaur, 183 F.3d at 1153. In Singh-Kaur, an applicant for asylum claimed that, because
he reported police misconduct to the superintendent of police, officers arrested and tortured him. Id.
at 1150–51. The Ninth Circuit expressed suspicion of the applicant’s testimony because he failed to
supply details of the events surrounding his arrest. Id. at 1153. This lack of detail supported the
court’s adverse credibility finding and denial of asylum. Id.
62. Prior to 2005, inconsistencies were sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding only if
they related to the basis of an applicant’s alleged fear of persecution going to the heart of the asylum
claim. Manimbao, 329 F.3d at 660. With the passing of the Real ID Act in 2005, however, judges
were given the discretion to find adverse credibility based on inconsistencies that do not relate to the
heart of the asylum claim. Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006)).
When adverse credibility is determined based on
inconsistencies in testimony and documents, an applicant must be given an opportunity to explain
the discrepancy. Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1999). If the applicant is not
given such an opportunity, the adverse credibility finding may be reversed. Soto-Olarte v. Holder,
555 F.3d 1089, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2009).
63. Zheng v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2005). The IJ must conduct an
individualized credibility analysis and cannot exclusively rely “on a factually unsupported assertion
in a State Department report to deem [an applicant] not credible.” Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1069
(9th Cir. 2000). Courts also may not infer adverse credibility merely because the events an applicant
relates are not described in a State Department document. Id. “Credible testimony by itself is
sufficient to support an asylum claim.” Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).
64. Use of counterfeit documents is a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility finding only if it
goes the heart of the asylum claim. Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he fact
that an asylum seeker . . . used false passports . . . without more, is not a proper basis for finding her
not credible.”), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, as
recognized in Singh v. Holder, 602 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2010).
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voluntary return to the country from which the applicant seeks asylum.65
The objective component requires a showing that the applicant “‘has a good
reason to fear future persecution.’”66 “Because asylum is a discretionary
form of relief, the standard for objective reasonableness is fairly low: Even a
ten percent chance of future persecution may establish a well-founded
fear.”67
For persecution to be committed by a proper source, it must be
committed by the government or a source that the government is either
unable or unwilling to control.68 Determining whether a persecutor qualifies
as one that the government is unable or unwilling to control is a difficult
task.69 Courts often look at whether the applicant reported persecutory

65. See Loho v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1016, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2008). In Loho, a citizen of
Indonesia applied for asylum based on her claim that indigenous Indonesians persecuted her due to
her race and religion. Id. at 1017. The applicant testified that she visited the United States twice
during the period of her alleged persecution, and voluntarily returned to Indonesia without seeking to
remain in the United States. Id. The applicant explained that she failed to attempt to seek asylum
because “the time was so short and [she] didn’t know about asylum.” Id. The IJ, BIA, and Ninth
Circuit agreed that the applicant’s failure to apply for asylum while in the United States, despite the
severe mistreatment she claimed to have suffered in Indonesia, made her not credible. Id. The Ninth
Circuit denied her asylum application based in part on this adverse credibility finding. Id. at 1018.
66. Ruiz v. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Al Najjar v. Ashcroft,
257 F.3d 1262, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001)). The applicant can satisfy the objective prong “by adducing
credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record of facts that would support a reasonable fear of
persecution.” Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Duarte de Guinac v. INS,
179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999)), overruled on other grounds by Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d
1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009). An applicant may demonstrate a reasonable fear of persecution by
showing that he or she has been targeted for persecution. See, e.g., Marcos v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d
1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that death threats were sufficient to establish a well-founded
fear). Violence towards an applicant’s family may also establish a well-founded fear. Korablina v.
INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 1998). An applicant may also satisfy the objective prong by
evidencing that there is a “pattern or practice” of persecution against people similarly situated. 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A) (2010); see also, e.g., Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th
Cir. 2004) (finding that a pattern and practice of the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Serbs satisfied the
objective prong). The Ninth Circuit has also implemented a “disfavored group analysis,” in which
the court looks at two factors: the persecution suffered by a group of which the applicant is a
member and the applicant’s individualized risk. Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir.
2009). The more severe the group’s persecution is, the less evidence the applicant must proffer of
individually specific targeting. Id.
67. Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1052–53 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987)).
68. Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2000). See also MARTIN, supra note 32, at
117 (“U.S. law has readily accepted that harm or threats from non-state actors can give rise to a valid
basis for asylum.” (citing Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International
Protection from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Agents, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 81, 106–
09 (1999)).
69. MARTIN, supra note 32, at 118. No country can guarantee protection from criminal activity,
and not all criminals qualify as persecutors whom the government is unable or unwilling to control.
Id.
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incidents to the government and whether the government took any action
beyond writing a police report.70
Finally, the applicant must show that the past persecution he or she
suffered, or the future persecution he or she fears, is motivated by at least
one of the five protected grounds as a “central reason.”71 The five protected
grounds are: race,72 religion,73 ethnicity,74 political opinion,75 and
membership in a particular social group.76 Even if an applicant satisfies
every element required for asylum, a judge must deny his or her claim if the
applicant falls under one of several categories of exclusion.77
The categories of exclusion mandate denial to applicants who fail to
promptly file for asylum,78 applicants who have committed “a particularly

70. Id. See also Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that after the applicant
reported several assaults and threats to the police, along with the perpetrators’ identifications, the
court found that the “failure by the authorities to protect [the applicant] and his family clearly
indicate[d] that the police either could not or would not control the [group] who threatened [the
applicant] and his family”).
71. See supra note 52. If a non-governmental actor is responsible for the persecution, and
targets its victims for reasons related to the five protected grounds, the requirement that the
persecution be motivated by one of these grounds is established, even if the absence of governmental
protection was not motivated by one of the grounds. Guidelines on International Protection: The
Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons at Risk of Being Trafficked, 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L.
372, 383 (2007) [hereinafter Guidelines on Trafficking]. This element is also established in the
alternative situation when the persecution is inflicted by a non-governmental actor and is not
motivated by one of the five protected grounds, but the government’s inaction is motivated by one of
the protected grounds. Id.
72. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT) and its inclusion of “race” as a protected ground appears to refer to “ethnic
groups identifiable by their shared culture as much as by any physical distinctiveness.” MARTIN,
supra note 32, at 230. Race can include “‘color, descent, or national or ethnic origin.’” Id.
73. There are two ways that a persecutor can target members of a particular religion: either by
attacking a group with a particular religious identification, regardless of whether particular members
are nonbelievers, or by attacking targets exhibiting religious practices and beliefs. Id. at 239.
74. The ethnicity ground is also referred to as “nationality” and can be described as a group
whose members have the same citizenship as those persecuting them, “but who belong to a different
linguistic or political community.” Id. at 231. The line between race and ethnicity are often blurred.
Id.
75. The “classic” political opinion claim involves an applicant who was a recognizable political
dissident (for example, one who participated in political demonstrations). Id. at 191. The late
twentieth century saw a growth of armed insurrections and civil wars that brought with them new
legal challenges for political asylum applicants. Id. The difficulty with fitting the new cases in the
existing paradigm involved neutrality and imputed political opinion. Id. Neutrality amounts to
political opinion if the persecutors impute political opposition to those claiming to be neutral. Id. at
199.
76. See infra Part III.
77. See infra notes 78–85 and accompanying text.
78. An applicant must apply for asylum within a year of arrival to the United States unless he or
she demonstrates extraordinary circumstances or a material change in circumstances. Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006).
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serious crime,”79 applicants who have committed a serious nonpolitical
crime prior to arrival in the United States,80 applicants who are reasonably
believed to pose a danger to the United States,81 applicants who have
participated in or provided funding for terrorism,82 applicants who have
firmly resettled in another country,83 applicants who can be safely removed
to a third country,84 and applicants who fall under the persecutor’s bar.85
C. Alternatives to Asylum
If an immigrant fails to qualify for asylum, his or her application is
automatically considered for three alternative forms of relief: withholding of
removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and
humanitarian asylum.86 While withholding of removal grants immigrants
the right to not be removed to their country of origin, it offers fewer benefits
than asylum.87 Withholding of removal is subject to the same bars as

79. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii).
80. Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1995). An applicant may not be granted asylum
if “there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime
outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). The judge is not required to balance the degree of persecution feared
against the seriousness of the offense. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 432 (1999).
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2006).
82. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v). The statute “imposes a two-part analysis: (1) whether an alien
engaged in a terrorist activity, and (2) whether there are not reasonable grounds to believe that the
alien is a danger to the security of the United States.” Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848, 855–56
(9th Cir. 2004). For a definition of qualifying terrorist activity, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2006).
83. An applicant can be denied asylum if he or she had been offered permanent residency in
another country in which he inhabited prior to arrival to the United States. Yang v. INS, 79 F.3d
932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2) (1996)); see also 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2006).
84. An applicant falls under this bar if he or she may be removed to another country, pursuant to
a bilateral agreement with the country, where his life or freedom would not be threatened on account
of one of the five protected grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2006).
85. An applicant falls under the persecutor’s bar if the applicant has engaged in the persecution
of another, motivated by one of the five protected grounds. See infra notes 244–47 and
accompanying text. To be barred, the person must have “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the persecution” of another on account of one of the five grounds. 8 U.S.C. §§
1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1101(a)(42) (2006).
86. See generally Dree K. Collopy, Incorporating a Hardship Factor in Asylum Claims Based
on Female Genital Mutilation: A Legislative Solution to Protect the Best Interests of Children, 21
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 469, 477−95 (2007).
87. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1999) (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, 429−30 (1984)). If an applicant is granted withholding of removal, he or she may still be
removed to any other country in which he does face a risk of persecution. El Himri v. Ashcroft, 378
F.3d 932, 937–38 (9th Cir. 2004). Unlike a successful asylum applicant, who may apply for

433

DO NOT DELETE

2/8/2012 3:19 PM

asylum,88 less the one year rule89 and the firm resettlement bar.90 In order to
qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate that it is
“more likely than not” that the applicant would be subject to persecution if
returned to his or her country.91 As in asylum, the fear of persecution must
be due to one of the five protected grounds.92
To be eligible for relief under CAT, an applicant must establish that if
sent to the proposed country of removal, the applicant “is more likely than
not to suffer intentionally-inflicted [torture amounting to] cruel and inhuman
treatment.”93 If an applicant successfully meets his or her burden of proof,

permanent U.S. residency after one year, a person granted withholding of removal cannot do so.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 n.6 (1987). Furthermore, if an applicant is granted
asylum, his immediate family members are granted derivative asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)
(2006). However, if an applicant is granted withholding of removal, the applicant’s family members
have no such right. Compare id. (granting derivative asylum for spouses and children of successful
asylum applicants), with id. § 1231(b)(3) (failing to give derivative protection to family members of
those with withholding of removal).
88. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text.
89. El Himri, 378 F.3d at 937 (explaining that withholding of removal has no statutory time
limit).
90. Siong v. INS, 376 F.3d 1030, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004).
91. Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001). In Al-Harbi, the applicant claimed
asylum from Iraq based on a fear of future persecution due to his opposition of Saddam Hussein. Id.
at 886. In analyzing the application for withholding of removal, the court noted that “[t]he record
contain[ed] detailed and extensive support, entirely independent of Al-Harbi’s own testimony,
demonstrating that if Petitioner were returned to Iraq years after participating in the American airlift
of Iraqi dissidents to Guam, he would likely be punished as a traitor.” Id. at 892. Compiling this
with other evidence, the court concluded that “no reasonable person could conclude other than that
Petitioner would likely be persecuted upon return to Iraq.” Id. at 893. The applicant met his burden
of proof that he would be subjected to persecution more likely than not upon return to Iraq, and was
therefore granted withholding of removal. Id. at 894. Note that the standard for withholding of
removal is higher than that for asylum. An applicant may be granted asylum if there is even only a
ten percent chance of being persecuted, while an applicant may only attain withholding of removal if
he can show more than a fifty percent chance of persecution. See supra text accompanying note 67.
Because withholding of removal has the additional burden of proving future persecution as “more
likely than not,” it differs from asylum in that it is mandatory, not discretionary. Al-Harbi, 242 F.3d
at 888. Similar to asylum, the possibility of persecution for withholding of removal can be shown
with either past persecution or fear of future persecution. Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060
(9th Cir. 2009). Also like asylum, the fear of future persecution must satisfy the objective and
subjective prongs. Id.; see also supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text (describing the objective
and subjective prongs). The government may rebut the showing of a fear of future persecution by
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a fundamental change of
circumstances or that the applicant can safely relocate within his country. 8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(b)(1)(i)−(ii) (2010).
92. Al-Harbi, 242 F.3d at 888. The five protected grounds are race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, and membership in a particular social group. See supra notes 72–76 and
accompanying text.
93. Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005). The CAT, to which the United
States is a signatory, forbids governments from returning a person to a country in which he may be
tortured. See Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). Note that torture is an extreme
concept that requires a higher showing than persecution. The required threat of torture is defined as:
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the applicant is entitled to a mandatory granting relief under CAT, which
affords him or her the same protection as withholding of removal.94 CAT
relief does not impose the same bars as asylum or the general provision of
withholding of removal.95 In addition, to be eligible for CAT relief, an
applicant need not show that he or she would be targeted on account of one
of the five protected grounds as he or she would for asylum or withholding
of removal.96
If an applicant is unable to attain protection under the aforementioned
forms of relief, due to a category of exclusion or the rebuttal of fear of future
persecution, the applicant may qualify for humanitarian asylum.97
Humanitarian asylum may be granted to an applicant if he or she provides
“compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country
[designated for removal] arising out of the severity of the past
persecution.”98 The applicant’s past persecution must have been atrocious

[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.
Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2000)). All
evidence pertaining to the possibility of torture must be considered, including evidence of flagrant
violations of human rights within the country of removal. Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1068 (citing 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) (2009)). The applicant’s testimony may be sufficient to sustain the burden of
proof without corroboration if it is deemed credible. Kamalthas, 251 F.3d at 1282 (citing 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(c)(2)−(3) (2000)). In evaluating the possibility of future torture, the court may examine
whether the applicant could safely relocate to another part of the country of removal. Id. (citing 8
C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (2000)). To qualify for relief under CAT, the torture must be “inflicted by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity.” Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 8 C.F.R. §
208.18(a)(1) (2002)). “Acquiescence” by the government does not require willful acceptance;
awareness and willful blindness by governmental officials is sufficient. Id. at 1197.
94. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) (2010).
95. The only qualification to the mandatory granting of CAT is if the applicant has committed a
“particularly serious crime” or an aggravated felony for which the penalty is at least five years.
Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1216 n.4 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(d), 1208.17 (2010)).
96. Kamalthas, 251 F.3d at 1283; see also Stephen Knight, Asylum from Trafficking: A Failure
of Protection, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 9 (July 2007), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/
documents/cgrs/advisories/Knight_%20ImmigBriefings_Trafficking_Asylum.pdf. See supra notes
72–76 for an explanation of the five protected grounds.
97. Brucaj v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2004). Even if an applicant is eligible for
humanitarian asylum, a judge may deny such asylum under his discretion. Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d
700, 702 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)−(b) (2006)). Such a denial, however, may not be
arbitrary or capricious. See Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1329 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995).
98. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A)−(B) (2010). See also Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note
71, at 377–78.
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enough to cause him or her to experience “ongoing traumatic psychological
effects which would render return to the country of origin intolerable.”99 It
may be said that the impact of the persecution on the individual continues.100
Like asylum and withholding of removal, humanitarian asylum requires
persecution on account of one of the five protected grounds.101 Therefore,
unless an applicant is successful in attaining relief under CAT, his remaining
options require establishing persecution on account of one of the five
protected grounds.102 For victims of human trafficking and former child
soldiers, the likeliest ground upon which to claim relief is membership in a
particular social group.103
III. MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
In order to qualify for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate that the
persecution he or she fears is motivated, at least in part, by one of five
grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group.104 If an applicant applies for protection as a member
of a particular social group, he or she must satisfy three requirements: “(1)
the applicant must identify a group that constitutes a ‘particular social
group;’ (2) the applicant must establish that s/he is a member of that group;
and (3) the applicant must show that s/he was persecuted based on that

99. Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 378. Humanitarian asylum is “reserved for rare
situations of ‘atrocious’ persecution, where the alien establishes that, regardless of any threat of
future persecution, the circumstances surrounding the past persecution were so unusual and severe
that he is unable to return to his home country.” Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir.
1999). Humanitarian asylum is generally restricted to those who have endured such extreme past
experiences as “torture, extended imprisonment or repeated physical abuse, usually at the hands of
totalitarian regimes.” Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 576 (7th Cir. 2008). See also, e.g.,
Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 1997) (listing “German Jews, the victims of the Chinese
‘Cultural Revolution’ . . . [and] survivors of the Cambodian genocide” as groups who may qualify
for humanitarian asylum). In Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d 998, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2001), an applicant was
found eligible for humanitarian asylum after having been arrested, detained three times, beaten,
tortured, forced to drink urine, slashed with knives, forced to eat meat against his religious beliefs,
burned with cigarettes, and forced to watch the sexual assault of his wife.
100. Lal, 255 F.3d at 1009. The BIA has denied humanitarian asylum to applicants because of
“the lack of evidence of severe psychological trauma stemming from the harm” they suffered in their
native countries. See, e.g., In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 326 (B.I.A. 1998). See also infra
note 270 and accompanying text. Conversely, in In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 20 (B.I.A. 1989),
the BIA granted humanitarian asylum to an applicant who, because of the persecution he suffered,
was “physically debilitated, [required to] wear a hearing aid due to his head injury, [was] always
anxious and fearful, and [was] often suicidal.”
101. Ghotra v. Gonzales, 179 F. App’x 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2006).
102. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 171, 227 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
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membership.”105 Of the five protected grounds, membership in a particular
social group has been the most debated.106 The number of attempts to define
this phrase has increased dramatically during the past decade.107 “[T]he
‘statutory language standing alone is not very instructive’ and . . . ‘in its
broadest literal sense, the phrase is almost completely open-ended.’”108
The seminal decision defining the term “social group” is Matter of
Acosta, in which the BIA defined the term as a group with a “common,
immutable characteristic” that the members “either cannot change, or should
not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
identities or conscience.”109 While all circuits embrace the Acosta
standard,110 the Ninth Circuit has added an alternative way to establish the
existence of a social group: the “voluntary associational” characteristic
analysis.111 This method defines a social group as a group whose members
are “closely affiliated with each other,” and “are actuated by some common
impulse or interest.”112 A social group may exist when there is a “voluntary
associational relationship among the purported members, which imparts
some common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a
member of that discrete social group.”113 The BIA has explicitly rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s approach.114 The BIA has explained “that Acosta does not
require ‘a voluntary associational relationship among group members’ nor
does it require an element of ‘cohesiveness or homogeneity among group
members.’”115 The BIA focuses instead on the group’s visibility: the extent

105. Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2003). When a circuit court is hearing a
case appealed from the BIA, the analysis of whether a group constitutes a social group for purposes
of asylum is reviewed de novo as it is a question of law. Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citing Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000)).
106. Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular
Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and
Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 48 (2008).
107. MARTIN, supra note 32, at 255.
108. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 170–71 (citing Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000)).
109. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by In re
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); see also Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084,
1092–93 (9th Cir. 2000).
110. Marouf, supra note 106, at 53.
111. Id. at 53 n.25 (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986)) (italics
omitted).
112. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
113. Marouf, supra note 106, at 53 n.25.
114. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956–57 (B.I.A. 2006).
115. Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N.
Dec. at 956–57). The Ninth Circuit recently acknowledged that the BIA does not require a
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to which society members perceive those with the characteristic in question
as members of a social group.116 The BIA explains that the inclusion of the
social group category as one of the five protected grounds “was not meant to
be a ‘catch all’ applicable to all persons fearing persecution.”117
All courts, however, have agreed that a social group cannot be defined
by the fact that it has been targeted for persecution.118 In other words, if the
applicant seeks to establish past persecution, the social group must have
existed before the persecution began; the group cannot have been created by
the alleged underlying persecution.119 As a matter of logic, “motivation
must precede action; and the social group must exist prior to the persecution
if membership in the group is to motivate the persecution.”120 As described
in Lukwago v. Ashcroft:
[A] “particular social group” must exist independently of the
persecution suffered by the applicant for asylum. Although the
shared experience of enduring past persecution may, under some
circumstances, support defining a “particular social group” for
purposes of fear of future persecution, it does not support defining a
“particular social group” for past persecution because the
persecution must have been “on account of” a protected ground.121
Accordingly, if an applicant can show a fear of future persecution,
beyond that presumed by a showing of past persecution, and this fear of

“voluntary associational relationship,” and recognized that some social groups are not comprised of
members who associate by choice. Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2010). The
Ninth Circuit therefore developed a two-pronged approach to determine whether a group constitutes
a social group. Id. (citing Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000)). “[A]
‘particular social group’ is one united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or
by an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that
members either cannot or should not be required to change it.” Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at
1093.
116. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959–60. The Seventh Circuit has rejected the BIA’s visibility
requirement. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Ramos v. Holder, 589
F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009).
117. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960. See also Guidelines on International Protection:
“Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02
(May 7, 2002), http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html [hereinafter Guidelines: Membership of a
Particular Social Group].
118. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956 (citing Guidelines: Membership of a Particular Social
Group, supra note 117, ¶ 14).
119. Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003). See generally Immigration and
Nationality Act, §§ 101(a)(42)(A), 208(b), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b) (2006);
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2010).
120. Sarkisian v. Att’y Gen., 322 F. App’x 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2009).
121. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 172 (citing INA § 101(a)(42)(A)).
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future persecution is motivated by a label he gained as a result of past
persecution, then persecutory acts may define such a social group.122
The characteristic defining the members of the group may be an innate
one, such as kinship ties, or may be a shared past experience, such as former
Large, internally diverse
military leadership or land ownership.123
demographic groups rarely constitute social groups.124 In addition, a social
group must be described with sufficient particularity.125 Examples of groups
that have been found to qualify as “particular social groups” include
families,126 homosexuals,127 transgender individuals,128 and those with a

122. Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 345–47 (3d Cir. 2008). In Gomez-Zuluaga, an
applicant sought protection based on a fear of future persecution motivated by her membership in a
particular social group. Id. at 345. The group she proposed described women who were abducted
and subjected to involuntary servitude and who subsequently escaped. Id. The court held that
because this group was created by persecution, and that the applicant could not be labeled as a part
of this group until after her persecution began, her past persecution could not have been motivated
by her membership in the group. Id. at 346. However, it could be a valid social group for purposes
of fear of future persecution. Id. at 345–46. “Because this group is based in part on events that
happened in the past, it is effectively a ‘status or condition’ that is sufficiently immutable to be
considered a particular social group.” Id. at 345. “[W]hile clearly related to the [abductor’s] past
mistreatment of numerous individuals, it exists independently of the persecution that Petitioner fears
that she will suffer in the future as a member of this particular social group.” Id. at 345−46
(emphasis added). The applicant’s escapee status is what would motivate the abductors to persecute
her in the future. Id. at 346. “Unlike in the past persecution context, her escapee status has already
attached, and a fortiori will have existed before any future persecution occurs.” Id.
123. Marouf, supra note 106, at 52 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006)).
124. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1572, 1576–77 (9th Cir. 1986). See also PedroMateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1150–51 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Kanjobal Indians comprising a
large percentage of the population in a given area is not a particular social group).
125. Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 F. App’x 956, 958 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that a social
group must “be defined with sufficient particularity to avoid indeterminacy”) (citing Scatambuli v.
Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009)). See also In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A.
2006) (holding that “noncriminal informants” is a group “too loosely defined to meet the
requirement of particularity”). A group is not defined with sufficient particularity if it is “too
amorphous to provide an adequate benchmark for determining group membership.” In re A-M-E &
J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007). For example, “the wealthy” fails the particularity
requirement because the characteristic of wealth is too subjective to define a social group:
Depending upon one’s perspective, the wealthy may be limited to the very top echelon;
but a more expansive view might include small business owners and others living a
relatively comfortable existence in a generally impoverished country. Because the
concept of wealth is so indeterminate, the proposed group could vary from as little as 1
percent to as much as 20 percent of the population, or more.
Id.
126. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576–77 (discussing that a family is a “prototypical example”
of a particular social group); but see Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1991)
(“[T]he concept of persecution of a social group [does not include] the persecution of a
family . . . .”). Note that if an applicant’s claimed social group is his family, and if he has family
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status based on former occupations.129 Examples of groups that have been
found not to qualify as social groups include government informants,130
young men targeted for gang recruitment but who refused to join,131 and
persons of low economic status.132
IV. DEFINING VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND CHILD SOLDIERS
A. Human Trafficking
Human trafficking is prohibited by international law and criminalized in
a growing number of nations.133 Nevertheless, trafficking in persons is
rampant.134 Human trafficking is one of the largest illegal trades in the
world, second only to drugs trafficking, and is predicted to become the
largest illegal trade within five years.135 The primary goal of human
trafficking is to profit through the exploitation of human beings136 who are

members with continuing safety in his hometown, this may lead the judge to discount the applicant’s
well-founded fear. Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2008).
127. Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005).
128. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other
grounds by Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1991).
129. See Cruz-Navarro v. INS, 232 F.3d 1024, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that people who
are persecuted because of their status as a former police or military officer may constitute a social
group but that current police or military are not a social group); but see Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS,
937 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1991) (declining to find former servicemen in the Guatemalan military a
particular social group).
130. Soriano v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2009).
131. Barrios v. Holder, 567 F.3d 451, 456 (9th Cir. 2009); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855,
858–62 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 744–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that
young Salvadoran men who resist gang violence is not a social group because it lacks both
particularity and social visibility).
132. Li v. INS, 92 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that people of low economic status in
China do not constitute a particular social group).
133. Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 372.
134. The United States Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report estimates that
800,000 people are trafficked across international borders every year, and that between four and
twenty-seven million are subject to modern-day slavery. Polaris Project, Human Trafficking
Statistics,
http://www.cicatelli.org/titleX/downloadable/Human%20Trafficking%20Statistics.pdf
(last visited Oct. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Polaris Project]. Romania has become a major transit for
selling people into Europe from destinations as far-reaching as Honduras, Afghanistan, the Congo,
and China. David Batstone, Romania A Global Center For Human Trafficking, CNN OPINION (Feb.
17,
2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/02/07/batstone.romania.sex.trade/index.html.
Romania offers “a strategic geographic location” as a connector between the East and West, which
makes it “a source, transit and destination country for the people trade.” Id. When Romania was
admitted to the European Union in 2007, relaxed border regulations enhanced its attraction for
international human traffickers, heightening the problem. Id.
135. Wald, supra note 2.
136. Id. It has been reported that on average, each “forced-laborer” generates $13,000 per year.
Polaris Project, supra note 134.
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often abducted, raped, beaten, sold into brothels, and forced into
prostitution.137 Victims are often told that if they attempt to escape, they or
their family members will be killed.138 While trafficking usually involves
women being forced into the sex trade, it is not limited to such.139 The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) states:
Trafficking in persons—also known as “human trafficking”—is a
form of modern-day slavery. Traffickers often prey on individuals
who are poor, frequently unemployed or underemployed, and who
may lack access to social safety nets, predominantly women and
children in certain countries. Victims are often lured with false
promises of good jobs and better lives, and then forced to work
under brutal and inhuman conditions . . . . [Trafficking includes] sex
trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud,
or coercion or in which the person induced to perform such an act is
under 18 years of age. . . . [It also includes] the recruitment,
harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for
labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion, for
the purpose of subjecting that person to involuntary servitude,
peonage, debt bondage, or slavery . . . . Trafficking can also take
place in labor situations such as domestic servitude, labor in a
prison-like factory, or migrant agricultural work.140
In all forms of trafficking, victims are treated as merchandise, “owned”
by their traffickers, with virtually no regard for their human rights and
dignity.141 Traffickers often torture their victims when they do not produce
enough money.142 Once a victim is abducted, she is often moved to a place
where there is a market for her services; this is often a place in which she

137. Knight, supra note 96, at 1.
138. Nilaj v. Gonzales, 205 F. App’x 902, 904 (2d Cir. 2006).
139. Id.
140. Immigration Remedies for Trafficking Victims, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1270569897006.shtm (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
In
determining whether something falls under the definition of trafficking, we look not only at the type
of work victims are made to do, but also examine the use of force, fraud, or coercion to obtain that
work. Id. The only exception not requiring any of these is the use of minors for commercial sexual
activity. Id. Trafficking also often involves the removal of organs. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Nov. 15, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 335
(2004).
141. Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 373.
142. Wald, supra note 2.
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lacks language skills and other basic knowledge that would enable her to
seek help.143
B. Child Soldiers
A child soldier is “any person below the age of 18 who is a member of
or attached to . . . armed forces.”144 Within the past decade, hundreds of
thousands of children have been killed while fighting in conflicts around the
world.145 Child soldiers are “forced to engage in hazardous activities such as
laying mines or explosives” and using weapons.146 These children usually
“live under harsh conditions with insufficient food and little or no access to”
medical care.147 Child soldiers are often brutally beaten and subjected to
humiliation.148 These children suffer severe punishments if they do not
follow their superior’s instructions perfectly or try to escape.149
Several factors contribute to the frequency with which children are
becoming soldiers.150 In countries suffering widespread destruction due to
war, families are frequently torn apart and children are left orphaned.151
Often, these children’s only source of security, food, medicine, and
protection is the armed forces.152 The armed forces prey on children’s

143. Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 376.
144. Child Soldiers Global Report 2008: Methodology, Terms, and Definitions, COALITION TO
STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/appendices/
methodology-terms-and-definitions (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
SOLDIERS
INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.child145. Child
Soldiers,
CHILD
soldiers.org/childsoldiers/child-soldiers (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Child Soldiers]. The
problem is worst in Africa, where children as young as nine are recruited to participate in armed
conflicts.
Some Facts, CHILD SOLDIERS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.child-soldiers.org/
childsoldiers/some-facts (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Some Facts]. Child soldiers are also
prevalent in various Asian countries as well as parts of Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East.
Id.
146. Child Soldiers, supra note 145. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and
Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, U.N. Doc. A/51/306
(Aug. 26, 1996), http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/Doc51.htm [hereinafter Promotion and
Protection].
147. Child Soldiers, supra note 145.
148. Id. Girl soldiers are especially “at risk of rape, sexual harassment, and abuse” in addition to
“being involved in combat and other tasks.” Id.
149. Id.
150. The increased use of child soldiers may be due to the emergence of “new wars” involving
fragmented armies, a proliferation of weapons, and increased involvement of civilian fighters.
Timothy Webster, Babes with Arms: International Law and Child Soldiers, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 227, 232 (2007).
151. Some Facts, supra note 145.
152. See id. While many children allegedly enlist “voluntarily,” they often have few alternatives.
Id. Some children join to survive “in war-torn regions after family, social, and economic structures
collapse.” Id. They also often join after watching their families tortured or “killed by government
forces or armed groups.” Id. Some enlist due to “poverty and lack of work or educational
opportunities.” Id. Some children witness the shooting of family members who refuse to join, and
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vulnerability to recruit them and train them to commit horrific acts.153 “The
children witness other children who are unwilling to comply being killed and
often feel they have no choice but to commit the acts that their superiors
order them to carry out.”154 Some children are told that if they do not follow
instructions, their parents will be killed.155 The United States and forty-four
other countries have recognized the prevalence of child soldier recruitment
and have dedicated themselves to bringing an end to the use of child
soldiers.156 Despite international recognition of the importance of ending the
suffering caused by human trafficking and the use of child soldiers, the
current state of asylum law as applied to these applicants is in contrast with
these needs.157
V. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. The Ability of Victims of Human Trafficking to Attain Asylum Under the
Current State of the Law
Although “trafficking” is defined differently among nations, each
country has a duty to protect and assist trafficking victims.158 In addition,
the UNHCR has a duty to ensure that victims of trafficking, who fear being
persecuted if returned to their country, shall not be returned to that
country.159 In 2000, the United Nations finalized a new international law on

join as their only alternative to the same fate. Voices of Young Soldiers, CHILD SOLDIERS
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.child-soldiers.org/childsoldiers/voices-of-young-soldiers (last visited
Oct. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Voices of Young Soldiers].
153. Dani Cepernich, Fighting for Asylum: A Statutory Exception to Relevant Bars for Former
Child Soldiers, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099, 1104 (2010).
154. Id. at 1115.
155. Voices of Young Soldiers, supra note 152.
156. Cepernich, supra note 153, at 1100. Forty-five countries, including the United States, are
parties to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict (Optional Protocol). Id. These countries have committed themselves to
taking “all feasible measures to . . . accord to [persons recruited or used contrary to the protocol] all
appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.”
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc-conflict.htm.
157. See infra notes 391–96 and accompanying text.
158. Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 373.
159. See id. at 374. In addition, the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness require nations to avoid actions that
would result in statelessness. Id. at 386−87. Countries are explicitly forbidden from depriving
nationality if doing so would result in statelessness. Id. at 387. A stateless person is defined as
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trafficking: the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children (The Palermo Protocol).160 The
United States also established domestic anti-trafficking legislation known as
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA).161 The TVPA
seeks to affect anti-trafficking policy abroad by authorizing the President to
withdraw U.S. assistance from countries that fail to sufficiently comply with
the U.S. government’s “‘minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking.’”162 In addition, the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services issue “T Nonimmigrant Status Visas” (T visas) to allow victims of
human trafficking to remain in the United States if they assist in an
investigation or prosecution of human trafficking.163 While Congress has
allocated up to five thousand T visas to be issued annually, the government
has issued less than one thousand per year since their implementation.164
However, given that between 14,500 and 17,500 foreign nationals are
trafficked into the United States every year, T visas alone are not sufficient
to address the veracity of the problem in the United States.165 Victims of
human trafficking whom the aforementioned regulations fail to protect may

somebody who is denied citizenship under the laws of any nation. Id. When addressing the
situation of a trafficking victim, it is important to keep the implications of statelessness in mind. Id.
The mere fact than an asylum applicant is a trafficking victim will not render her stateless per se. Id.
A trafficking victim continues to possess the citizenship she enjoyed before being abducted. Id.
However, an applicant may be unable to prove citizenship if her abductors confiscated her identity
documents, which they often do. Id. While the victim is rendered unable to prove her identity, it is
often only temporary and may be easily overcome with the assistance of the applicant’s country of
origin. Id.
160. Janie Chuang, The United States As Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat
Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 438 (2006).
161. Id. at 439.
162. Id. (quoting Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386 § 108(a)).
163. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Victims of Human Trafficking: T
Nonimmigrant Status, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a
7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=02ed3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=02ed
3e4d77d73210VgnVM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). In order to be eligible
for a T visa, an applicant must (1) be a victim of human trafficking, (2) be in the United States,
American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or at a port of entry due to
trafficking, (3) comply with requests from a law enforcement agency to assist in the investigating of
human trafficking (or is under the age of eighteen, or unable to cooperate due to physical or
psychological trauma), (4) demonstrate that she would endure tremendous hardship if removed from
the United States, and (5) be admissible to the United States. Id. T visas are issued for three years,
after which the holder is eligible to adjust status to permanent residency. T-1 Visas for Victims of
Human Trafficking, THE ANSARI LAW FIRM, PLLC: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW,
http://www.ansarilawfirm.com/index.cfm/hurl/obj=365/TVisasforVictimsofHumanTraffickingAusti
nimmigrationandvisaattorney.cfm (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
164. Katherine Kaufka, T Nonimmigrant Visas and Protection and Relief for Victims of Human
Trafficking: A Practitioner’s Guide, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, n.8 (June 2006).
165. Polaris Project, supra note 134.

444

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 423, 2012]

2/8/2012 3:19 PM

Seeking Asylum
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

seek to find refuge under asylum.166 To be granted asylum, the victim must
fall within the definition of “refugee,” a hard task for most victims to
accomplish.167
Assuming the applicant is found credible and does not encounter
evidentiary problems, a victim of human trafficking typically has little
trouble proving that her abduction and trafficking amounts to persecution.168
In addition, a victim of human trafficking does not encounter greater
obstacles than most other asylum applicants in proving that her persecution
was carried out by the government or an agent that the government is
unwilling or unable to control.169 The fundamental obstacle that victims of
human trafficking encounter lies in the third requirement of an asylum
claim: the persecution must be motivated by one of the five protected
grounds.170 Unless an applicant can show that she was targeted on the basis

166. There are different instances in which a victim of human trafficking would apply for asylum:
the victim may have been trafficked abroad and escaped, or trafficked within national territory,
escaped, and fled abroad in search of international protection. Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note
71, at 337.
167. Id. at 373. Not all victims or potential victims of trafficking fall within the scope of the
refugee definition. Id. at 374. The Convention defines a refugee as a person residing outside his or
her country of nationality, who is unable or unwilling to return because of a “well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.” See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
168. Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 377 (“Persecution can be considered to involve
serious human rights violations, including a threat to life or freedom, as well as other kinds of
serious harm or intolerable predicament, as assessed in the light of the opinions, feelings and
psychological make-up of the asylum applicant.”). See also supra notes 53–56 and accompanying
text. The evolution of international law in criminalizing trafficking has made it easier to determine
whether an act of trafficking amounts to persecution. Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at
377. Trafficking inherently involves “serious violations of human rights which will generally
amount to persecution.” Id. See also supra notes 133–43 and accompanying text. In addition, if an
applicant is able to prove that she will be reprised or re-trafficked upon return to her country, such
actions would also usually amount to persecution. Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 379.
169. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (describing the requirement that persecution
must have been inflicted by the government or a source that the government is unable or unwilling to
control). See also Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 380 (explaining that both
governmental and non-governmental actors may qualify as persecutors within the refugee
definition). Many countries have failed to implement measures to prevent trafficking. Id. at 381.
The “mere existence” of a law that prohibits human trafficking is insufficient unless it is effectively
implemented. Id. Even if a country implements mechanisms to protect victims of trafficking, if the
applicant has been unable to afford herself of the protections of such mechanisms, the country may
be deemed unable to protect the victim. Id. Note that even when a victim is trafficked outside of the
country of abduction, and is mainly exploited outside the country of origin, the victim may still have
a well-founded fear of persecution in their original country. Id.
170. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text (describing that persecution must be
motivated by one of five protected grounds). See also Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at
383 (“In relation to asylum claims involving trafficking, the difficult issue for a decision-maker is
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of her race, religion, political opinion, or nationality, the likeliest ground for
a victim of human trafficking to attain asylum is that of membership in a
particular social group.171
Victims of human trafficking have two viable social groups to claim
membership in, both with separate inherent obstacles: “victims of human
trafficking”172 or “females173 in (a given country).”174 Case law has been
bleak as to whether “victims of human trafficking” may constitute a social
group.175 A group titled as such fails the requirement that the group must
exist before the persecution began; the social group “cannot be defined
exclusively by the fact that it is targeted for persecution.”176 A victim of
human trafficking, by definition, is not such until after she is trafficked.
Consequently, an applicant cannot be granted asylum based on past
persecution motivated by her membership in the group of “victims of human
trafficking” because membership in that group does not occur until after the
persecution occurs.177 While a social group defined by past persecution
cannot be the motivating ground for that past persecution, it can be the
motivating ground for a fear of future persecution.178 Consequently, an
applicant can only be granted protection as a member of the group “victims
of human trafficking” if she can prove a fear of future persecution
independent from that presumed by a showing of past persecution.179 The
future persecution feared must be motivated by the applicant’s status as a
victim of prior persecution; prior persecution alone is insufficient to
establish this.180

likely to be linking the well-founded fear of persecution to a [protected] ground.”). “Central to the
dispute over the applicability of refugee law to trafficking victims is the question of the link, or
‘nexus’” between the persecution and one of the five protected grounds. Knight, supra note 96, at 3.
Human trafficking is a commercial enterprise and is primarily motivated by profit rather than
persecution on a ground under the Convention. Id. at 8. “Immigration judges (IJs) and the BIA
most frequently treat the claims of women refugees fleeing trafficking as victims of personal,
criminal problems, and thus as ineligible for asylum for failure to demonstrate any link to any of the
five statutory grounds.” Id. at 6.
171. Knight, supra note 96, at 3.
172. The application of the phrase “victims of human trafficking” as used in this Comment
encompasses all similar definitions, such as “former victims of human trafficking” or “former forced
prostitutes.”
173. While not all victims of human trafficking are females, this Comment will focus on their
claims, as they are predominantly targeted. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 176–94 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 176–94 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
179. Sarkisian v. Att’y Gen., 322 F. App’x 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2009).
180. See id. at 143. See also supra note 122, and infra note 187 and accompanying text
(describing cases in which an applicant’s past persecution defined the grounds for her feared future
persecution). The future persecution that the applicant fears may be in a number of forms in addition
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The Third Circuit’s Sarkisian v. Attorney General181 opinion discusses
two cases where applicants established valid social groups defined by past
persecution for the purpose of establishing a fear of future persecution:
Lukwago v. Ashcroft,182 and Gomez-Zuluaga v. Attorney General.183 In both
cases, the applicants presented evidence that previously persecuted members
of their group were subject to repeated persecution.184 In Lukwago, the
applicant presented evidence that the persecuting party he escaped from
“exacted retribution for escape, killing escaped children to punish them or to
make an example of them.”185 Likewise, in Gomez-Zuluaga, the applicant
established that the persecuting party she escaped from had killed escaped
members of her family and others who had escaped.186 Sarkisian found it
dispositive that in both cases, the “killings were retribution for escape.” The
court explained that:
The fact of past persecution in these cases was relevant not merely
because the applicants were persecuted, their persecutors knew who
they were, or their persecutors might persecute them again. Rather,
these applicants presented evidence showing their persecutors
would retaliate because of their escape, an experience shared with
other escapees, or at least that the escape was one central reason for
persecution.187
The applicant in Sarkisian was denied asylum because, unlike the applicants
in Lukwago and Gomez-Suluaga, this applicant did not explain “how her
past persecution [would] motivate her abductors to target her.”188
If an applicant alternatively seeks to define her social group as “females
in (her specified country),” she avoids violating the rule that prohibits
groups created by their persecutors but encounters the obstacle that,
to reprisals for having escaped, or repeated trafficking. See Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note
71, at 378−79. A victim who is returned to her country may experience severe discrimination and be
ostracized because she was raped. Knight, supra note 96, at 5. Such ostracism may itself be serious
enough to constitute persecution. Id. “Where the individual fears such treatment, her or his fear of
persecution is distinct from, but no less valid than, the fear of persecution resulting from the
continued exposure to the violence involved in trafficking scenarios.” Id. at 4.
181. 322 F. App’x 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2009).
182. 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003).
183. 527 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2008).
184. Sarkisian, 322 F. App’x at 142.
185. Id. at 143 (citing Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 179–80).
186. Id. (citing Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 347).
187. Id.
188. Id.
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according to some circuits, a social group cannot be too broad.189 The BIA
has not specifically addressed in a precedential decision whether females,
without any defining characteristics other than their nationality, may
constitute a social group.190 The BIA has, however, recognized women who
belong to a particular tribe as a social group.191 Immigration judges and
federal circuit courts have varied as to their determination of whether gender
is too broad to define a social group.192 In Kuci v. Attorney General, the
Third Circuit found that a group entitled “young women who have been
approached or threatened with kidnapping, forced [prostitution] or killing by
human traffickers” was too broad to be a social group.193 The finding that
this group was “too broad and too generalized”194 to constitute a social group
shows that this court would hold the even broader category of “females” to
also not constitute a social group. Similarly, in Rreshpja v. Gonzales,195 the
Sixth Circuit held that a group defined as “young, attractive Albanian
women” may not constitute a social group because it is too broad.196 In
Gomez v. INS,197 the Second Circuit found that “women from El Salvador”
did not compromise a social group because “a broadly based characteristic”
such as gender cannot define a social group.198 There have also been several

189. See supra note 124, and infra notes 193–208 and accompanying text.
190. Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2010). See also Gerald Seipp, A Year in
Review: Social Visibility Doctrine Still Alive, but Questioned, 87 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1417,
1423 (July 19, 2010).
191. See In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996).
192. See infra notes 193–208 and accompanying text.
193. 299 F. App’x 168, 169–70 (3d Cir. 2008). In this case, individuals known for trafficking
women attempted to kidnap the asylum applicant twice. Id. The kidnappers threatened her, saying
“this is not the end of it.” Id. The Third Circuit found that the social group “was too broad because
it was based solely on . . . the person’s gender and contact, no matter how minimal and apparently,
without regard to any particular age, with human traffickers.” Id. While the court found that the
attempted abductions were sufficient to amount to persecution, it maintained that the “particular
social group” was not cognizable under INA § 101(a)(42)(A). Id. at 170.
194. Kuci, 299 F. App’x at 170. The court also supported its denial of asylum by relying on the
decision in Lukwago, holding “that the ‘particular social group’ must exist independently of the
persecution suffered by the applicant for asylum.” Id. The court, however, failed to examine the
difference between applying this notion towards claims based on past persecution and claims based
on future persecution. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text (describing the distinction).
195. 420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005).
196. Id. (noting that allowing such a social group would allow “virtually any young Albanian
woman who possesses the subjective criterion of being ‘attractive’ [to] . . . be eligible for asylum in
the United States.”). The court also noted that “Albanian women who are forced into prostitution”
could not be a social group because a social group cannot be defined by the fact that it suffered
persecution. Id. at 555–56. As the Third Circuit did in Kuci, the court here also failed to discuss that
this could constitute a social group for purposes of establishing a fear of future persecution. See
Knight, supra note 96, at 10–11.
197. 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
198. Id. at 664. In Gomez, the applicant had been raped and beaten in El Salvador on five
separate occasions, during which guerillas threatened to kill her. Id. at 662.
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instances where immigration judges have denied social group status to
females.199
On the other hand, some circuits have noted that gender can define a
social group. In Mohammed v. Gonzales,200 the Ninth Circuit stated that
females of a particular nationality, “or even in some circumstances females
in general,” may constitute a social group.201 The court further stated that
“‘U.S. law is unfortunately under-developed in th[e] area’ of gender
persecution,”202 but the fact that gender can constitute a social group is
“simply a logical application of our law.”203 The Ninth Circuit continued
that it would be difficult to argue “that sex or gender, combined with . . .
nationality” does not fall under the social group definition set forth in Acosta
because gender is in fact an innate characteristic fundamental to individual
identity.204 The Eighth Circuit followed the reasoning in Mohammed and
found that “Somali females” constitute a particular social group.205 The

199. In one case an IJ found that gender did not constitute a social group where a young Albanian
woman was kidnapped while walking down the street. Knight, supra note 96, at 7. After being
repeatedly raped for a week, she was put in a boat to be taken to Italy for prostitution. Id. When the
boat was apprehended by authorities, the victim was freed and went home where she received
several threatening phone calls. Id. After fleeing to the United States and applying for asylum, the
IJ found her testimony credible, but denied her application because her persecution was not related
to one of the five protected grounds; the kidnappers “did not target [her] for any purpose other than
for their own criminal enrichment.” Id. The court found her to have been “randomly targeted . . .
for no other reason than her location at that particular moment, her gender, and her age . . . [and not]
on account of one of the Act’s enumerated grounds,” implying that gender did not constitute a
ground. Id.; see also infra notes 327–31 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ use of criminal
intent as a grounds for denying asylum).
In another case involving a young Albanian woman, the applicant was repeatedly approached
by men who told her she could earn money “‘the easy way,’” and was heckled and chased. Knight,
supra note 96, at 7–8. At one point, men from the same group surrounded her with four cars, but she
managed to escape. Id. The IJ stated that the evidence “strongly demonstrates that Albania
currently has an overwhelming problem with the trafficking of women” and referenced reports by
the U.S. State Department demonstrating that 30,000 Albanian woman were employed in
prostitution abroad. Id. at 8. Despite the overwhelming evidence that women in Albania were often
trafficked, the IJ denied asylum, attributing the persecution to criminal violence rather than
persecution motivated by one of the five grounds. Id. In another case of a young Albanian woman,
an IJ noted that “kidnapping of women for the purposes of trafficking in prostitution is a fairly
common event in Albania,” but the social group of “Albanian women” is too broadly defined. Id. at
9.
200. 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005).
201. Id. at 797.
202. Id. at 797 n.17 (quoting DEBORAH ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES
367 (3d ed. 1999)).
203. Id.
204. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 797. See also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
205. Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007).

449

DO NOT DELETE

2/8/2012 3:19 PM

Tenth Circuit has similarly held that gender can constitute a social group.206
The Sixth Circuit has also agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s finding.207 In
addition to circuit splits, there has even been disagreement within individual
circuits as to the appropriateness of defining a social group based on
gender.208 Ultimately, the determination of whether gender may define a
social group rests on the circuit in which the case sits and in some circuits,
even the applicant’s turn of luck as to the majority’s opinion.
One recent Ninth Circuit case, however, shows hope of the BIA
affirmatively determining that gender may define a social group. In
Perdomo v. Holder,209 the applicant sought asylum based on her fear of
persecution as a member of the social group, “women between the ages of
fourteen and forty” in Guatemala.210 The IJ and BIA denied her application,
“finding that a social group consisting of ‘all women in Guatemala’ is overbroad and ‘a mere demographic division of the population rather than a
particular social group.’”211 The Ninth Circuit heard the case on appeal and
remanded it.212 It first struck down the BIA’s contention that the gender-

206. Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1198–200 (10th Cir. 2005) (requiring either gender or
membership in a tribe to identify a social group).
207. Diallo v. Mukasey, 268 F. App’x 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Because these opinions
followed Acosta, as the Sixth Circuit does, I find them particularly persuasive.”). In this case, the
Sixth Circuit found that one’s gender coupled with their membership in a specific ethnic group
constitutes a social group. Id.
208. In the Third Circuit there have been conflicting answers as to whether gender may define a
social group. Compare Kuci, 299 F. App’x at 169–70 (finding that a group defined by a person’s
gender is too broad to constitute a social group), with Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.
1993) (finding that “women from Iran” can constitute a social group, citing that the BIA in Acosta
“specifically mentioned ‘sex’ as an innate characteristic that could link the members of a “‘particular
social group’”). The Ninth Circuit has also had contradictory holdings. Compare Mohammed v.
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that females of a particular nationality “or even
in some circumstances females in general” may constitute a social group), with Sanchez-Trujillo v.
INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576–77 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing that neither “males taller than six feet” nor
“young, working class, urban males of military age” may constitute social groups, even if such
individuals were at greater risk of persecution than the general population). The court held as such
because they are broad, “sweeping demographic division[s] [that] naturally manifest a plethora of
different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings.” SanchezTrujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577. The court described “that to recognize any person who might
conceivably establish that he was a member of this class is entitled to asylum or withholding of
deportation would render the definition of ‘refugee’ meaningless.” Id.
209. 611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010).
210. Id. at 664. Perdomo claimed that women in Guatemala were murdered at a high rate with
impunity. Id. at 663. The applicant submitted several reports by the U.S.-based Guatemala Human
Rights Commission. Id. at 664. These reports documented “the torture and killing of women, the
brutality of the killings, the non-responsiveness of the Guatemalan government to such atrocities, the
countrywide prevalence of the killings, and the lack of explanation for the killings.” Id. The
applicant had not been persecuted in the past; her claim was based on a fear of future persecution.
Id.
211. Id. at 663.
212. Id. at 669.
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defined social group is too internally diverse to be recognized.213 The court
then explained that to deny a social group merely because it is broad is
“inconsistent with [BIA] precedent and [the Ninth Circuit’s] case law.”214
The court “rejected the notion that a persecuted group may simply represent
too large a portion of a population to allow its members to qualify for
asylum.”215 The court explained that in the instances in which social groups
were denied as too broad, “[t]here [was] no unifying relationship or
characteristic to narrow th[e] diverse and disconnected group.”216 The court
distinguished such cases with the proposed group of “women in (a given
country),” citing precedent that “gender is an ‘innate characteristic’ that is
‘fundamental to [one’s] identit[y].’”217 The court pointed out that the BIA
failed to take into consideration that such an “innate characteristic may be
the basis for a protected social group.”218 The Ninth Circuit did not make a
conclusive determination as to whether “women in (a given country)” may
constitute a social group and the BIA has yet to hear the case on remand.219
Some courts have noted that the question regarding gender-related
claims should not be whether gender constitutes a social group, but whether
the group members are sufficiently likely to be targeted such that they could
be said to be persecuted “on account of” their gender.220 In one case, the

213. Id. at 666 (explaining that the BIA does not require strict homogeneity in social groups).
The court cited cases in which the Ninth Circuit found valid such “internally diverse social groups as
homosexuals and Gypsies.” Id. at 668. The court cited Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “all alien homosexuals are members of a ‘particular social group’”) and
Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that “[t]here is no question that
Gypsies are an identifiable ethnic group and that being a Gypsy is a protected ground [for asylum]”).
Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668.
214. Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 664.
215. Id. at 669 (citing Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1996)). See also infra note 298
for an analysis of Singh.
216. Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668 (quoting Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir.
2005)). The court discussed Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010), in
which the proposed social group of “returning Mexicans from the United States” was too broad
because its members did not share a voluntary relationship or an innate characteristic. Perdomo, 611
F.3d at 668.
217. Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 667 (quoting Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir.
2005)).
218. Id. at 668.
219. Id. at 669 (remanding the case for the BIA to determine, “in the first instance” whether
women comprise a social group).
220. See, e.g., Valle-Montes v. Att’y Gen., 342 F. App’x 854, 857 (3d Cir. 2009); Gao v.
Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Keisler v. Hong Yin Gao, 552 U.S. 801
(2007); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199−200 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A) (2006)).
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Third Circuit found that an applicant’s persecution was not motivated by her
gender, noting that her father suffered from the same attack that she did.221
The Third Circuit found in another case that an applicant was not kidnapped
on account of her membership in the social group of “young, female
students” because evidence showed that kidnappings in her country were
widespread and that members of this group were no more likely to be
targeted than any other member of society.222 Other courts look at the
prevalence of persecution towards the group to determine if membership in
the group is the motivation for the persecution.223 The prevalence of
persecution towards a group is “a relevant factor in determining the visibility
of a group in a particular society.”224 As the fate of victims of human
trafficking who seek asylum under the social group of “women from (a
given country)” is unsettled, so too is that of former child soldiers.
B. Former Child Soldiers
As a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, the United States has an
obligation to take “‘all feasible measures to . . . accord to [persons within its
jurisdiction recruited or used contrary to the protocol] all appropriate
assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their social
reintegration.’”225 Because of developmental reasons, children are not
expected to present testimony to support their asylum claims with the same
precision as adults and are held to less stringent requirements during the
adjudication of their claims.226 Nevertheless, child soldiers encounter two

221. Valle-Montes, 342 F. App’x at 857.
222. Nicolas v. Att’y Gen., 379 F. App’x 229, 230–31 (3d Cir. 2010).
223. See, e.g., Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[A] factfinder could
reasonably conclude that all Somali females have a well-founded fear of persecution based solely on
gender given the prevalence of [female genital mutilation].”).
224. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006) (citing Guidelines: Membership of a
Particular Social Group, supra note 117, ¶ 14).
225. Cepernich, supra note 153, at 1100 (quoting Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, art. 6, ¶ 3,
Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc-conflict.htm) (brackets
in original). See also supra note 156 and accompanying text.
226. Benjamin Ruesch, Open the Golden Door: Practical Solutions for Child-Soldiers Seeking
Asylum in the United States, 29 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 184, 190 (2008). A child asylum seeker need
not prove that he sought the protection of the government in the country in which he was persecuted.
Id. In addition, an adjudicator must give a child the benefit of the doubt when determining the
credibility of his testimony. Id. at 191 (citing Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 314 (7th Cir. 2004)).
This particularly benefits a child soldier who, while describing the grave conditions that he was
forced to endure, fails to maintain eye contact with the adjudicator. Id. However, child asylum
applicants may encounter greater obstacles with the passage of the Real ID Act in 2005. Id.
(referencing Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I, § 101(a)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. 231, 306–
09 (2005)). The Real ID Act allows an adjudicator to demand corroboration of an applicant’s
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main obstacles when applying for asylum: establishing membership under
one of the five protected grounds, and overcoming the persecutor’s bar.
Unless an applicant can show that he was targeted on the basis of race,
religion, political opinion, or nationality, the likeliest ground for a child
soldier to attain asylum is that of membership in a particular social group.227
Similar to victims of human trafficking, case law has been unclear as to
whether child soldiers qualify as a social group. There are two possible
social groups for child soldiers to claim membership in, neither of which are
easy to apply: “former child soldiers” and “children in (a given country).”228
Under current case law, “former child soldiers” generally cannot constitute a
social group unless they can prove a fear of future persecution beyond that
presumed from a showing of past persecution.229 Similar to a group defined
as “victims of human trafficking,” a group defined as “former child soldiers”
fails the requirement that the social group “cannot be defined exclusively by
the fact that it is targeted for persecution.”230 Consequently, an applicant
cannot be granted asylum based on past persecution motivated by
membership in the group of “former child soldiers” because membership in
that group does not occur until after the persecution occurs.231 While past
persecution cannot define the social group for the purpose of establishing a
motivating ground for that past persecution, such actions can define a social
group for the purpose of establishing a ground for fear of future
persecution.232 Therefore, an applicant can only be granted protection as a
member of the group “former child soldiers” if the applicant proves a fear of
future persecution independent from that presumed by a showing of past

testimony. Id. (citing Real ID Act, § 101(a)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. 231, 303). If an applicant fails to
provide such, the adjudicator may deem him not credible and deny his application. Id. at 191.
While an adjudicator is still required to give a child the benefit of the doubt, misapplications of the
Real ID Act continue to lead to improper denials. Id. at 192.
227. See supra notes 71–76 (describing that persecution must be motivated by one of five
grounds). See also Martha Drane, Note, Street Children as Unaccompanied Minors with Specialized
Needs: Deserving Recognition as a Particular Social Group, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 909, 921 (2010)
(“With regard to the five groups an asylum claim can be based on, a street child will most likely
attempt to argue that ‘street children’ constitute a ‘particular social group.’”). See also Wendy
Perlmutter, An Application of Refugee Law to Child Soldiers, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 137, 139
(2001) (“Child soldiers would most likely prove claims of persecution on account of membership in
a particular social group.”).
228. See infra notes 229–42 and accompanying text.
229. See infra notes 230–33 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
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persecution.233 To do this, the applicant must produce evidence that
persecutors target individuals who are former child soldiers as retaliation for
escape.234
If an applicant alternatively seeks to define the social group as “children
in (their specified country),” another obstacle arises: some courts have held
that a social group cannot be excessively broad.235 Courts tend to deny
social group status to youth because such a group fails the social visibility
and particularity requirements.236 The Ninth Circuit has held that “the class
of young, working class, urban males of military age” is too broad to
constitute a social group, and would therefore likely strike down the
possibility of the even broader description, “young.”237 The Second Circuit
has also held that a “broadly-based characteristic[] such as youth” cannot
define a social group.238 The Third Circuit has similarly held that “youth” is
“far too vague and all encompassing” to qualify as a social group.239 The
Fourth Circuit refused to grant social group status to “adolescents in El

233. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. See also Sarkisian v. Att’y Gen., 322 F.
App’x 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2009).
234. See supra notes 178–87. For an example of a case in which a former child soldier was able
to show that he would be persecuted on account of his status as an escaped soldier, see supra note
180 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 237–40 and accompanying
text.
236. See infra notes 237–40 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit has also added that
“children” may not constitute a social group because, “unlike innate characteristics, such as sex or
color, age changes over time, possibly lessening its role in personal identity.” Lukwago v. Ashcroft,
329 F.3d 157, 171 (3d Cir. 2003).
237. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576–77 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit
described that such a group:
[D]oes not exemplify the type of “social group” for which the immigration laws provide
protection from persecution. Individuals falling within the parameters of this sweeping
demographic division naturally manifest a plethora of different lifestyles, varying
interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings. As the IJ said in his written
decision, “This [class of young, working class, urban males] may be so broad and
encompass so many variables that to recognize any person who might conceivably
establish that he was a member of this class is entitled to asylum or withholding of
deportation would render the definition of ‘refugee’ meaningless.”
In sum, such an all-encompassing grouping as the petitioners identify simply is not
that type of cohesive, homogeneous group to which we believe the term “particular social
group” was intended to apply.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
238. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
239. Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005). In Escobar, the applicant had been
a street child in Honduras since the age of nine. Id. at 364–68. Having been physically abused by
gangs, and realizing that the police refused to protect him, he eventually fled to the United States.
Id. His application for asylum rested on issues of poverty, homelessness, and youth. Id. The Third
Circuit determined that such issues existed throughout the world, and it was therefore impossible to
distinguish the applicant from children in similar conditions in other countries. Id. The court held
that such universal conditions could not support his claim, and denied the group recognition as a
social group. Id.
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Salvador who refuse to join the gangs of that country because of their
opposition to the gangs’ violent and criminal activities,” not only because
such a group is too broad, but also because it is “ill-defined.”240 Few cases
suggest that “youth” is sufficient to characterize a group as a social group.
In In re Kasinga, the BIA found that young women in the TchambaKunsuntu Tribe constituted a social group.241 Although the factors of gender
and opposition to the practice of female genital mutilation confounded the
issues, the BIA “found youth to be an integral component in defining her
particular social group.”242 It should be noted that most, if not all, denials on
the ground of breadth concerned groups defined with vague terms such as
“youth” or “adolescents” rather than a specific age range.243
If a former child soldier is deemed eligible for asylum—whether by the
recognition of children as a social group, or by his membership in the social
group of “former child soldiers,” coupled with a showing of fear of future
persecution—he is still not free from obstacles. As previously mentioned,
the INA includes a persecutor’s bar, stating that if an applicant inflicted
persecutory acts on another, he is ineligible for asylum.244 To be barred, this
person must have “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the

240. Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 F. App’x 956, 958 (4th Cir. 2009).
241. See Drane, supra note 227, at 929–30. This tribe practiced female genital mutilation, a
practice which the applicant, a young woman, strongly opposed. Id. The applicant feared returning
to her home country due to the possibility of being subjected to such an invasive act. Id.
242. Id. (quoting Laura P. Wexler, Note, Street Children and U.S. Immigration Law: What
Should Be Done?, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 545, 563 (2008)). The court held so despite the fact that
the applicant will eventually “age out” of her youth status. Id. The BIA’s decision in In re Kasinga
has been read to imply that because young women from a specific tribe who oppose genital
mutilation qualify as a social group, child soldiers may constitute a social group with a similar
definition:
[The definition given in In re Kasinga] includes gender (women), a general age group
(young), a particular tribe, a physical characteristic (not had FGM), and a political view
(oppose FGM). The specificity of this definition indicates that a similarly narrow
definition would be used for child soldiers. The relevant social group could be defined
as, children under age 18 who have performed the duties of soldiers and who oppose
performing such duties . . . [with the addition of a] distinction based on nationality or
geographic location.
Perlmutter, supra note 227, at 139. Such a conclusion, however, is unfounded because it fails to
recognize that to define a social group with the past experience of having been forced to “perform
the duties of soldiers” in effect defines the social group based on its past persecution, an illegitimate
description. See supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 237–40 and accompanying text.
244. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1101(a)(42) (2006). This persecutor’s bar applies to asylum
and withholding of removal, but does not disqualify an applicant from receiving protection under
CAT. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1160 (2009).
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persecution” of another on account of one of the five protected grounds.245
To determine whether an applicant’s acts constitute persecution, the court
must engage in “a particularized evaluation of both personal involvement
and purposeful assistance in order to ascertain culpability.”246 Selfdefensive acts do not constitute persecution.247 If a court finds that an
applicant persecuted others on account of a protected ground, the burden
shifts to the applicant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that he did not.248 If the applicant claims to have engaged in persecutory
actions due to coercion inflicted upon him, he raises an issue over which
there is currently much debate.
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided Fedorenko v. United States249 and
addressed the relevance of duress in applying the persecutor’s bar. The
Supreme Court held the bar to apply regardless of the voluntariness of the
person’s action.250 It would apply even if he claimed to have been forced
into service as a prisoner of war and would be executed if he tried to
escape.251 The bar discussed in Fedorenko, however, did not address the
persecutor’s bar from asylum; it addressed a persecutor’s bar from
protection under the Displaced Persons Act (DPA), an Act put in place to
assist refugees from Europe who were driven out of their homelands by

245. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006). In determining what constitutes such assistance, courts
have looked at the interpretation of similar statutes for guidance. See, e.g., Laipenieks v. INS, 750
F.2d 1427, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1985) and concluding that the
applicant did not assist or participate in the persecution of others based on political opinions);
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981) (interpreting a similar statute and
explaining that cutting the hair of inmates before they were executed would not constitute
persecution, but shooting at escaping inmates would qualify as persecution).
246. Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2006). The court must examine whether
the applicant’s assistance was material by measuring “the degree of relation his acts had to the
persecution itself” by asking such questions as: “How instrumental to the persecutory end were those
acts? Did the acts further the persecution, or were they tangential to it?” Id. at 928. In Alvarado,
the applicant served as a military interpreter during the interrogation and torture of suspects. Id.
The court held that this constituted persecution of others due to the integral role it played in the
persecution. Id. at 929–30. “This standard does not require actual ‘trigger-pulling’. . . but ‘[m]ere
acquiescence or membership in an organization,’ is insufficient to satisfy the persecutor exception.”
Id. at 927 (quoting Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)).
247. Vukmirovic, 362 F.3d at 1252 (“[To hold] that acts of true self-defense qualify as
persecution would run afoul of the ‘on account of’ requirement in the provision. It would also be
contrary to the purpose of the statute.”).
248. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(c)(2)(ii), 208.16(d)(2) (2010). See also Alvarado, 449 F.3d at 930.
An applicant may rebut the presumption by evidencing that his actions were part of legitimate
criminal prosecutions and that they were unrelated to any of the five protected grounds. Id.
249. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
250. Id. at 511–12.
251. Karl Goodman, Negusie v. Holder: The End of the Strict Liability Persecutor Bar?, 13 N.Y.
CITY L. REV. 143, 143–44 (2009).
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World War II.252 Despite this distinction, Fedorenko has been treated as a
landmark case for the asylum persecutor’s bar, requiring its application to
those who persecuted others, whether they did so voluntarily or under
duress.253
A recent Supreme Court case, Negusie v. Holder,254 may change the
applicability of Fedorenko to asylum cases. In Negusie, an asylum applicant
claimed to have been forced to be a prison guard at a camp where he knew
the prisoners were being persecuted.255 The immigration judge denied

252. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490. The DPA was put into effect in 1948, and enabled such
refugees “to emigrate to the United States without regard to traditional immigration quotas.” Id.
The DPA specifically excluded persons who had assisted in the persecution of civilians. Id. The
petitioner in Fedorenko was serving in the Russian army when he was captured by the Germans. Id.
The Germans assigned him to a Nazi concentration camp in Poland, where he served as a guard. Id.
at 494. The district court had described this concentration camp as a “human abattoir” where several
hundred thousand Jewish civilians were murdered. Id. At trial, six witnesses were survivors of this
camp and claimed that they had “seen petitioner commit specific acts of violence against inmates of
the camp.” Id. at 498. The petitioner claimed that, having been forced to serve as a guard, he had no
“personal involvement in the atrocities committed at the camp.” Id. at 491. The Court found that
the plain language of the DPA, requiring exclusion of those who “assisted the enemy in persecuting
civil[ians]” mandated a literal interpretation, such that “an individual’s service as a concentration
camp armed guard⎯whether voluntary or involuntary” barred him from the benefits afforded to
refugees by the DPA. Id. at 491–92.
253. See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that personal
motivation is irrelevant to a determination of persecution of others). See also Cepernich, supra note
153, at 1118. While, until recently, no court questioned whether Fedorenko was controlling over
asylum cases, one case, Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2001), has proven to be an outlier
in holding that Fedorenko allows for the interpretation that a coercion exception to the persecutor’s
bar may apply. See id. at 814. This is the only case that has read Fedorenko to mean that duress
may remove an applicant from under the persecutor’s bar. Consequently, Judge Clarence Arlen
Beam filed a dissenting opinion against this finding. Id. at 815 (Beam, J., dissenting). A thorough
reading of Fedorenko clearly illustrates that voluntariness is not relevant when applying the
persecutor’s bar. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 (holding that “the deliberate omission of the word
‘voluntary’ from [the statute] compels the conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted in
the persecution of civilians ineligible . . . .”). Whether Fedorenko applies to asylum cases, however,
is a debatable question. See infra notes 353–99 and accompanying text.
254. 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
255. Id. at 1162–63. In Negusie, Eritrean state officials took custody of the applicant and forced
him to perform hard labor. Id. at 1162. He was also forced to work as a prison guard for four years.
Id. The Court noted that it was “undisputed that the prisoners he guarded were being persecuted on
account of [one of the five] protected ground[s].” Id. The applicant testified that he had:
[C]arried a gun, guarded the gate to prevent escape, and kept prisoners from taking
showers and obtaining fresh air. He also guarded prisoners to make sure they stayed in
the sun, which he knew was a form of punishment. He saw at least one man die after
being in the sun for more than two hours. Petitioner testified that he had not shot at or
directly punished any prisoner and that he helped prisoners on various occasions.
Id. at 1162–63. The applicant managed to escape from the prison and fled to the United States. Id.
at 1163.
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asylum to the applicant on the ground, in line with Fedorenko, that the
persecutor’s bar applies even to those whose actions were coerced and
involuntary.256 The BIA affirmed the ruling of the IJ on the same grounds.257
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision, following the same
reasoning.258 The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court, which held
that the BIA and Fifth Circuit misapplied Fedorenko.259 The Court noted
that the statute in Fedorenko and the one applicable to asylum reflect
principles that differ in significant respects.260 The Court highlighted that
because Fedorenko addressed a different statute, enacted for a different
purpose,261 it is not controlling over the BIA’s interpretation of the
persecutor’s bar as applied toward asylum applicants.262 The Court pointed
out that the BIA’s decision should not be accorded Chevron deference263
because such deference is only accorded when an agency has “exercised its
interpretive authority,” which the BIA had not.264 Rather, the Court
explained that the BIA determined that voluntariness is not relevant in
applying the persecutor’s bar based on a mistaken assumption that
Fedorenko controls.265 The Court concluded that because the BIA
incorrectly applied Fedorenko, the case must be remanded to the BIA to

256. Id. After finding that the applicant was for the most part credible, the IJ concluded that
petitioner’s work as an armed guard constituted persecution. Id. The IJ explained that despite the
lack of evidence that the applicant was malicious or that he was an aggressive person who mistreated
the prisoners, “the very fact that he helped [the government] in the prison compound where he had
reason to know that they were persecuted constitutes” persecution, barring him from asylum and
withholding of removal. Id. The IJ, however, granted the applicant CAT relief because he was
likely to be tortured upon return to Eritrea. Id. See also supra notes 93−96 and accompanying text
(describing the provisions of CAT).
257. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1163. The BIA repeated that the fact that the applicant “was
compelled to participate as a prison guard, and may not have actively tortured or mistreated anyone,
is immaterial.” Id. The BIA described that “an alien’s motivation and intent are irrelevant to the
issue of whether he ‘assisted’ in persecution.” Id. The court may only analyze “the objective effect
of an alien’s actions.” Id. The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s grant of CAT relief. Id.
258. Id. The Fifth Circuit agreed that “whether an alien is compelled to assist in persecution is
immaterial for persecutor-bar purposes.” Id. (citing Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34).
259. Id. at 1164 (“The Government, like the BIA and the Court of Appeals, relies on Fedorenko
to provide the answer. This reliance is not without some basis, as the Court there held that
voluntariness was not required with respect to another persecutor bar. To the extent, however, the
Government deems Fedorenko to be controlling, it is in error.” (citations omitted)).
260. Id. at 1165.
261. See supra note 252 and accompanying text (describing the statute discussed in Fedorenko).
262. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1166.
263. See supra note 49 (explaining the doctrine of Chevron deference).
264. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1167.
265. Id. The Court described this failed assumption as stemming from “a failure to recognize the
inapplicability of the principle of statutory construction invoked in Fedorenko, as well as a failure to
appreciate the differences in statutory purpose.” Id. See also infra note 357 and accompanying text
(describing the principle of statutory construction employed in Fedorenko).
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determine, in the first instance, whether motive and intent are relevant to the
persecutor’s bar as applied to asylum.266
C. Alternatives to Asylum for Victims of Human Trafficking and Former
Child Soldiers
If a victim of human trafficking or former child soldier is denied asylum
due to a failure to fall under a protected ground, she will also be unable to
While
attain withholding of removal or humanitarian asylum.267
humanitarian asylum is designed to protect applicants who fail to satisfy the
elements for asylum, applicants are not excused from having to establish one
of the five protected grounds.268 Moreover, humanitarian asylum has the
additional burden that an applicant must demonstrate a “compelling reason”
not to be returned to their country.269 Even if a victim of human trafficking
or a former child soldier can establish severe psychological effects
amounting to a “compelling reason,” which cannot be established without
difficulty,270 the applicant must still establish that their persecution was
motivated by one of the five protected grounds.271

266. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1167. Due to the significant differences between the statute in
Fedorenko and the one applicable to asylum, and “[h]aving concluded that the BIA has not yet
exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in question, ‘the proper course, except in rare
circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.’” Id. at 1167–
68 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)). See also supra note 49 (explaining the
doctrine of Chevron deference). “‘[I]f an agency erroneously contends that Congress’ intent has
been clearly expressed and has rested on that ground, we remand to require the agency to consider
the question afresh in light of the ambiguity we see.’” Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1167 (quoting Cajun
Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 924 F.2d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
267. See Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 377.
268. Ghotra v. Gonzales, 179 F. App’x 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2006).
269. Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 377–78. A “compelling reason” applies when
an applicant’s past persecution was “particularly atrocious and the individual is experiencing
ongoing traumatic psychological effects which would render return to the country of origin
intolerable.” Id. at 378. See also supra note 100 and accompanying text. It may be said that “the
impact on the individual of the previous persecution continues.” Guidelines on Trafficking, supra
note 71, at 378.
270. Due to the burden of establishing a “compelling reason,” humanitarian asylum is notoriously
difficult to attain and courts rarely consider granting it. See, e.g., Jalloh v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 148,
150 (2d Cir. 2007). In Jalloh, the applicant was attacked by a group who opposed his political
opinions. Id. Initially, the attackers physically assaulted him on at least two occasions, during one
of which his family was also assaulted. Id. On another occasion, when the applicant’s house was
looted and his valuables were stolen, he “pleaded for his life and was spared.” Id. On another
occasion, the attackers took the applicant and his family outside of their house and tied the
applicant’s and his wife’s hands behind their backs. Id. They subsequently beat the applicant and
raped his wife and burned his house to the ground. Id. The applicant and his family were then taken
to a mountainous area, where they were held captive for two weeks. Id. They were kept as

459

DO NOT DELETE

2/8/2012 3:19 PM

Withholding of removal also fails to protect victims of human
trafficking and former child soldiers left behind by asylum law. To be
eligible for withholding of removal, as for asylum, an alien must establish
that her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of
removal on account of one of the five protected grounds.272 To be granted
withholding, the applicant must establish a “clear probability” of
persecution.273 “This burden of proof is more stringent than that required to
establish eligibility for asylum.”274 Accordingly, if an applicant is unable to
satisfy the less stringent burden of asylum, she will necessarily be unable to
satisfy the higher standard for withholding of removal.275
Unlike asylum and withholding of removal, CAT relief may seem
promising for victims of human trafficking and former child soldiers
because it does not require membership in one of the five protected
grounds.276 In determining whether an applicant qualifies for CAT relief, the
fact finder must determine whether, upon return to the home country, the
applicant would “more likely than not” be subjected to torture.277 An
applicant could argue that being forced into human trafficking or child
soldiering qualifies as torture. Even if the applicant is successful in doing
so, past torture does not create a presumption of future torture under CAT.278
The applicant would have to prove that a future abduction is “more likely
than not,”279 which could be hard to do. Therefore, similar to withholding of
removal and the provisions of humanitarian asylum, victims of human
trafficking and former child soldiers abandoned by asylum law also likely

prisoners, beaten, and threatened with death and amputation. Id. The BIA held that the applicant’s
past experiences were not severe enough to qualify him for humanitarian asylum. Id. Humanitarian
asylum is generally restricted to those who have endured such extreme past experiences as “torture,
extended imprisonment or repeated physical abuse, usually at the hands of totalitarian regimes.”
Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 576 (7th Cir. 2008). See also supra note 100 and
accompanying text.
271. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
272. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006). See also supra notes 86−90 and accompanying text.
273. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984). See also supra notes 86−90 and accompanying
text.
274. Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1987)). See also supra notes 86−90 and accompanying text.
275. Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 557 (“Because [the applicant] has not established that she is eligible
for asylum, she ‘cannot satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of deportation.’” (quoting
Koliada v. INS, 259 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir. 2001)).
276. See supra text accompanying note 96.
277. See supra text accompanying note 93.
278. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (2010) (explaining that past torture is relevant to a finding of future
torture but does not create a presumption of such).
279. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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would fail to find protection under CAT.280 United States asylum law must
be modified in order to afford protection to these groups.
VI. SYNTHESIZING A UNIFORM APPROACH TO GRANTING ASYLUM TO
VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND FORMER CHILD SOLDIERS
A. Victims of Human Trafficking
The most viable route for a female victim of human trafficking to attain
asylum is to establish that she was targeted for persecution due to her
gender, or in other words, her membership in the particular social group of
“women in (her specified country).”281 Despite the fact that such a social
group satisfies all requirements set forth by the seminal case Acosta,282
courts have varied as to whether it is a proper social group.283 Yielding to
the purpose of United States asylum law, public policy considerations, and
trends in scholarly thought,284 the line of cases that hold that gender as a

280. See supra notes 267–79 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 168–76 and accompanying text. A victim of human trafficking can
alternatively gain asylum under the social group of “victims of human trafficking” if she can prove
that upon return to her country, she will be targeted because of her status as an escaped trafficker.
See supra notes 174–87 and accompanying text. There is a lack of case law exhibiting women who
have shown a fear of future persecution based on their status as escaped traffickers. However, it is
possible for a victim of trafficking to prove such. See Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at
379 (“Trafficked women . . . can be particularly susceptible to serious reprisals by traffickers after
their escape and/or upon return, as well as to a real possibility of being re-trafficked or of being
subjected to severe family or community ostracism and/or severe discrimination.”). There is also a
chain of actors involved in trafficking, beginning with the abductors in the country of origin, to
transporters, sellers, and purchasers. Id. at 382. The threat posed by people at each level may help
victims establish a fear of future persecution. Id.
282. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). In addition to the factors to be discussed, a
social group must possess “a recognized level of social visibility,” which women satisfy as they are
easily identifiable. Sarah Siddiqui, Comment, Membership in a Particular Social Group: All
Approaches Open Doors for Women to Qualify, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 526 (2010) (citing In re
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 211). The BIA also requires a social group to have particularity and
immutability, both of which the social group of “women” possesses. Id.
283. The Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that defining a social group based on
gender is too broad. See supra notes 193–208 and accompanying text. Yet, the Third, Sixth, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that defining a group based on gender is not too broad. See
supra notes 193–208 and accompanying text. Note that the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have
held both ways. See supra notes 193–208 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., Siddiqui, supra note 282. Siddiqui explains that, despite being a broad category,
women are a social group and share common fundamental and social characteristics. Id. at 526.
While there are many differences among women, they share a “defined social status” and are viewed
as a group by society. Id. The article points out that women often face harm that would not have
been inflicted upon them were they men. Id. at 506–07. The failure of some courts to grant social

461

DO NOT DELETE

2/8/2012 3:19 PM

social group is too broad a category should be struck down. The Convention
does not restrict social groups to a specified list.285 Rather, it states that the
term social group “should be read in an evolutionary manner, open to the
diverse and changing nature of groups in various societies and evolving
international human rights norms.”286
Courts have justified their restriction on the breadth of social groups
based on the notion that an excessively broad group would fail the
particularity requirement.287 The definition of the particularity requirement,
however, does not include a restriction on the breadth of the group.288
Particularity simply means to be defined with enough clarity and specificity
as to distinguish group members from non-group members.289 Therefore,
the particularity requirement addresses the language used to define a group,
not the narrowness of the group itself. Categorizing a group by gender
establishes a clear way to distinguish group members from non-group
members and thus undoubtedly satisfies the particularity requirement.290
Courts that have cited to the particularity requirement when deeming a group
defined by gender as impermissibly broad have done so without an adequate
foundation.291
Courts hold that “women from (a specified country)” is too broad a
category to define a social group because allowing for such a group would
open the floodgates; courts fear that any woman from said country would be
able to attain asylum.292 In In re R-A-,293 the DHS was apprehensive to

group status to women is clearly misguided; judges should conform to the line of cases that correctly
apply Acosta and grant social group recognition to women. Id. at 532.
285. See Guidelines: Membership of a Particular Social Group, supra note 117.
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that a
social group failed the particularity requirement because it made up a large portion of society); Zhou
v. Holder, 376 F. App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that “a large group of people” lacks
“sufficient particularity” to constitute a social group).
288. A group is not defined with sufficient particularity if it is “too amorphous to provide an
adequate benchmark for determining group membership.” In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
69 (B.I.A. 2007). See also supra note 125. A group fails the particularity requirement if is too
loosely defined, causing it to be indeterminate. See supra note 125. Neither of these explanations
suggests that the size of the group affects its particularity.
289. See supra note 125.
290. Siddiqui, supra note 282, at 526.
291. See supra notes 193–208 and accompanying text (citing circuits that have found gender too
broad a category to define a social group). See also infra note 300 and accompanying text
(describing the lack of legal basis for imposing a breadth restriction).
292. See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005) (“There may be
understandable concern in using gender as a group-defining characteristic. One may be reluctant to
permit, for example, half a nation’s residents to obtain asylum on the ground that women are
persecuted there.”). Scholars have noted that “[o]ften lurking, and sometimes explicit, in [decisions
denying social group status to females] is an apparent concern over the large numbers of women
potentially eligible for asylum, should the individual’s claim be recognized.” Knight, supra note 96,
at 11. See also Siddiqui, supra note 282, at 521 (explaining that opposition to the recognition of
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define a social group as “women in Guatemala,” because of the fear of
opening the floodgates to countless cases.294 This led the court to construct a
much narrower social group: “[M]arried women in Guatemala who are
unable to leave the relationship.”295 When judges want to grant victims
asylum, but are prohibited from placing them in the social group of
“women,” they create varying social group definitions like the one in In re
R-A-, which lead to “artificial and frivolous [social group] constructions.”296
Whether the fear is of opening the floodgates to countless victims of
persecution, or that many applicants will be granted asylum who do not
genuinely deserve it, both concerns are unfounded.
Assuming, arguendo, that all women from a specified country would
indeed be eligible for asylum, which they would not,297 this should not
render a claim invalid.298 While breadth is a frequent issue in gender-based
claims,299 it has no basis in law.300 The size of a proposed social group “is
not a relevant criterion . . . . The fact that large numbers of persons risk
persecution cannot be a ground for refusing to extend international
protection where it is otherwise appropriate, . . . [n]or is it consistent with
well-established facts.”301 Decisions that strike down social groups as
overbroad usually do so when the purported social group is defined by
gender as a defining characteristic for a social group is “based on a misunderstanding that it is
overbroad and, in effect, would recognize every woman in certain countries as a refugee”).
293. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 2001).
294. Siddiqui, supra note 282, at 527.
295. Id.
296. See id. at 530 (citing Eve McCabe, Comment, The Inadequacy of International Human
Rights Law to Protect the Rights of Women as Illustrated by the Crisis in Afghanistan, 5 UCLA J.
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 419, 445 (2000–01)).
297. If courts recognize “women in (a specified country)” as a social group, this would not render
all women in that country eligible for asylum because the remaining elements cannot be established
without difficulty. See infra notes 314–24 and accompanying text.
298. Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e reject the notion that an applicant
is ineligible for asylum merely because all members of a persecuted group might [consequently] be
eligible for asylum.”). In Singh, the BIA denied an Indo-Fijian man’s application for asylum from
Fiji because the violence to which he was subjugated was directed against Indo-Fijians, a group that
comprised half of the nation. Id. at 1356. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit deemed it unfounded to
reject a group simply because it represents a large portion of the population. Id. at 1359. Although
the Ninth Circuit in this case did not affirmatively decide whether Indo-Fijians would constitute a
social group, “its reasoning supports the principle that the size and breadth of a group alone does not
preclude a group from qualifying as such a social group.” Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669
(9th Cir. 2010).
299. See Knight, supra note 96, at 11.
300. Id.
301. Id. (quoting Guidelines: Membership in a Particular Social Group, supra note 117, ¶¶ 18–
19).
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characteristics that fail to specify the reasons why the persecutors harm the
victims.302 The DHS has explained that “[t]hese decisions should not be
read to mean that a group must be small in order to qualify as a particular
social group.”303
Courts that are cognizant of this fact have noted that “the focus with
respect to [gender-related] claims should be not on whether either gender
constitutes a social group . . . but on whether the members of that group are
sufficiently likely to be persecuted.”304 Courts conflating the elements of the
appropriateness of the social group definition and the likelihood of being
persecuted have stated that a group is overbroad because “no factfinder
could reasonably conclude that all . . . women [from a certain country] had a
well-founded fear of persecution based solely on their gender.”305 However,
importing the “well-founded fear” requirement to an analysis of social group
is improper.306 Not every member of a social group has to have a wellfounded fear of persecution in order for that social group to be valid.307
Whether an applicant’s group membership actually gives rise to a wellfounded fear of persecution is a separate question from the analysis of the
viability of the social group.308 Conflating such variables is erroneous.
The fact that a group’s breadth has no place in an analysis of a particular
social group is well established in international law. International guidelines
explain that using “[t]he size of the group . . . as a basis for refusing to
recognise ‘women’ generally as a particular social group . . . has no basis in
fact or reason, as the other grounds are not bound by this question of
size.”309 The international guidelines continue to explain that “[w]omen are
an example of a social subset of individuals who are defined by innate and
immutable characteristics and are frequently treated differently to men. As

302. Department of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief at 22, In
re R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (B.I.A. 2005) (No. A 73 753 922), available at
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/legal/dhs_brief_ra.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) [hereinafter
DHS Position].
303. Id.
304. Niang v. Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005). See also supra note 220 and
accompanying text.
305. Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994).
306. DHS Position, supra note 302, at 22–23. The well-founded fear standard is a separate
element and “[t]he confusion of th[is] element . . . in the social group analysis results in an incorrect
and misleading conclusion.” Id. at 23.
307. Id. (“There is no requirement that all those who possess a protected characteristic have a
well-founded fear in order for a characteristic to qualify as a protected one.”).
308. See supra notes 306–07 and accompanying text.
309. Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 14
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 457, 466 (2002) [hereinafter Guidelines: Gender-Related Persecution]. See
also Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 385 (“[T]he size of the purported social group is
not a relevant criterion in determining whether a social group exists.”).
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such, they may constitute a particular social group.”310 Australia, Canada,
and the United Kingdom have all recognized gender as a proper basis for a
particular social group.311 Despite international recognition that gender may
define a social group, many U.S. courts have taken the opposing view. A
recent Ninth Circuit case, however, shows hope that we may begin to head
in the right direction.
In Perdomo v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit did not make a conclusive
determination as to whether “women in [a given country]” may constitute a
social group, but remanded the case for the BIA to make such a legal
determination in the first instance.312 Critics of the Ninth Circuit’s holding
in Perdomo may express concern that if the BIA holds valid the social group
of “women in Guatemala,” many fraudulent cases may be brought by
women who do not genuinely fear persecution, but rather are seeking to take
advantage of the opportunity to move their families to the United States.313
Some circuits have rejected “women” as a social group on the reasoning that
“if a woman has a well-founded fear of persecution because she is a woman,
the necessary implication is that all women have a well-founded fear of
persecution simply because they are women, and this simply cannot be.”314
However, it is erroneous to conclude that allowing a gender-based social
group would render all applicants of that gender eligible for asylum. Such
an assumption fails to acknowledge that social group membership is one of a
number of elements that an applicant must satisfy to be granted asylum.315
Among these hurdles is the fact that an applicant must prove a well-founded
fear of persecution.316 To do so, the applicant must either evidence past
persecution, or a well-founded fear of future persecution supported by

310. Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 386.
311. Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667 n.5 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Minister for Immigration
& Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 76 ALJR 667 (Austl.); Higbogun v. Canada, [2010] F.C.
445 (Can.); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [1999] 2 All E.R. 546 (Eng.)).
312. Id. at 669. Despite the promising nature of the Ninth Circuit’s holding, there is no guarantee
that the BIA will approve the social group. Even if it does, it is unknown whether Perdomo will
“resonate [] in other circuits or [extend] to embrace women in other countries which can be accused
of relegating women to an inferior status.” Seipp, supra note 190, at 1423.
313. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) (2006) (explaining that applicants who have been granted asylum also
earn derivative asylum for their spouses and children).
314. Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United States,
Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 25,
61 (1998). See also, e.g., supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text (noting cases that have denied
social group recognition to women for fear of opening the floodgates).
315. Knight, supra note 96, at 11.
316. See supra notes 50, 55–57 and accompanying text.
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subjective and objective components.317 These requirements prevent an
applicant with a fraudulent claim and no risk of persecution from being
granted asylum.318 This is especially true in light of the recent passage of the
Real ID Act, which gives judges with the discretion to find adverse
credibility merely because an applicant fails to corroborate her testimony.319
Thus, if an applicant’s claim has no basis, she would lack corroborating
evidence, which may lead to an adverse credibility finding and,
consequently, denial of asylum.320 Another obstacle is that an applicant not
only has to prove membership in a social group, but also that her feared
persecution is on account of that membership.321 In order to do so, an
applicant may need to prove that women in her country are abducted
significantly more than men, or that the prevalence of the abduction of
females in her town is high.322 Other countries that have recognized genderbased claims further illustrate that doing so would not give rise to a surge of
female refugees.323 Canada was the first nation to acknowledge that women
fleeing gender-related persecution qualified for protection, and reported no
explosion of claims by women following the implementation of such
guidelines.324
Even if courts’ fear of opening the floodgates was well-founded, the
proper course of action should not be to return victims to countries where
their human rights will be violated, but to address the human rights
violations at their roots.325 If courts close the doors to gender-based claims

317. See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text.
318. As described by Kevin Johnson, Dean of the University of California-Davis Law School,
even if the BIA in Perdomo announces approval of the social group “women in Guatemala,”
“[p]roving that [the applicant] will face persecution if she is returned to Guatemala and that the
country doesn’t protect its young women will be hard to prove . . . . Any other Guatemalan women
hoping to take advantage of [such a ruling] will have to do the same.” Mariano Castillo, Court
Ruling Affects Guatemalan Women Seeking Asylum in U.S., CNN (July 13, 2010, 7:13 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/07/13/california.guatemalan.appeal.
319. The Real ID Act allows an adjudicator to demand corroboration of an applicant’s testimony.
See supra note 226. If an applicant fails to provide such, the adjudicator may deem the applicant not
credible and deny the application. See supra note 226.
320. See supra note 226 (describing that an adverse credibility finding necessitates the denial of
asylum).
321. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining that in order to qualify for protection
as a member of a social group, an applicant must identify a valid group, establish membership in the
group, and show persecution on account of that membership). See also supra note 220 and
accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 220–23 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (noting other countries that have recognized
women as a social group). See also Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution:
Fear of Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 120 (2007).
324. Jenny-Brooke Condon, Comment, Asylum Law’s Gender Paradox, 33 SETON HALL L. REV.
207, 216, 255 (2002).
325. Musalo, supra note 323, at 120.
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due to a fear of an influx of applications, they undermine the purpose of
allowing the social group category.326
Another argument many courts have used to deny social group status to
females is that trafficking is purportedly not motivated by gender, but is
rather criminal behavior towards the population in general.327 As one
scholar pointed out, “The repeated references by adjudicators denying
trafficking claims to the fact that the conduct is criminal in nature are
puzzling.”328 Whether a persecutory act constitutes criminal behavior has no
bearing on whether that persecution was motivated by one of the five
protected grounds.329 A persecutor may have various motives for targeting
an applicant.330 The existence of other motivating factors does not render
the applicant ineligible.331 To be eligible for asylum, an applicant’s
persecution must have been motivated by one of the five protected grounds,
not as the sole reason, but as “at least one central reason.”332 Gender may

326. See Bradley B. Banias, Comment, “Membership in a Particular Social Group”: Does
America Comply with Its International Obligation?, 1 CHARLESTON L. REV. 123, 129 (2007).
327. Knight, supra note 96, at 6. See, e.g., supra note 199 (describing that a victim of human
trafficking was denied asylum because the IJ found that she was not persecuted because of one of the
five protected grounds, and that her kidnappers “did not target [her] for any purpose other than for
their own criminal enrichment” (quoting In re H-H-, A# redacted (Chi., IL, Immigration Court, May
29, 2003) at 7 (CGRS Case #2506))).
328. Knight, supra note 96, at 8.
329. Id. (“Many acts of persecution also amount to criminal conduct; that reason alone hardly
renders them unable to support a claim to asylum. Physical violence, rape and sexual assault,
torture, destruction of personal property, death threats, and other crimes have all been found to
support grants of asylum.”).
330. See, e.g., Mamouzian v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004) (“That [applicant’s]
supervisor might also have been motivated by personal dislike . . . does not undermine [applicant’s]
claim of persecution.”); Jahed v. INS, 356 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that the persecutor
was motivated both by his desire for money as well as the applicant’s political affiliation); Borja v.
INS, 175 F.3d 732, 737–38 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that a Filipino man who had been targeted for
extortion as well as political motives was eligible for asylum).
331. “[V]ictims [of human trafficking] are likely to be targeted above all because of their
perceived or potential commercial value to the traffickers. This overriding economic motive does
not, however, exclude the possibility of Convention-related grounds in the targeting and selection of
victims of trafficking.” Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 383. “[E]ven if an individual is
not trafficked solely and exclusively for a Convention reason, one or more of these Convention
grounds may have been relevant for the trafficker’s selection of the particular victim.” Id. at 384.
332. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). This standard has changed with the passage of the Real
ID Act. For applications filed before May 11, 2005, the applicant need only have shown that their
persecution was motivated “at least in part” by a protected ground. See, e.g., Sinha v. Holder, 564
F.3d 1015, 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacating the IJ’s decision denying asylum for an applicant
who was targeted “at least in part” on account of his race); Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 996 (9th
Cir. 1998) (“Torture . . . conducted at least in part on account of [a protected ground], provides a
proper basis for asylum and withholding of deportation even if the torture served intelligence
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still qualify as a “central reason” for the persecution, even if another factor
was the dominant reason.333
In addition to coming into alignment with international standards and
being in accordance with mandatory U.S. precedent, public policy justifies
allowing females status as a social group.334 Human trafficking is a
prevalent problem, one for which the root is hard to weed out.335 One reason
why traffickers are difficult to catch is because the only ones who know of
their whereabouts—the victims—may be apprehensive to speak out due to
fear of being punished if returned to their country.336 If a victim obtains
asylum, she may be more comfortable revealing information because she can
rest assured that she will not be sent back to her country where she may be
punished. By encouraging these victims to cooperate with the government
in tracking down traffickers, the rate of trafficking may effectively be
reduced. Currently, there are programs that seek to bring about this effect,
but fail to do so effectively.337
B. Former Child Soldiers
Like victims of human trafficking, former child soldiers may seek
membership in either of two social groups: “former child soldiers” or
“children in (a specified country).”338 Applicants may receive asylum under
the social group of “former child soldiers” only if they can establish a fear of
future persecution independent from their showing of past persecution by

gathering purposes.” (emphasis added)). For applications filed after May 11, 2005, the Real ID Act
specifies that one of the five protected grounds must be “at least one central reason” for persecuting
the applicant. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). One way to determine that a motive is a “central
reason” for persecution is “if the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if such motive did
not exist.” Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009). Alternatively, a motive
qualifies as a “‘central reason’ if that motive, standing alone, would have led the persecutor to harm
the applicant.” Id. This latter route would likely be harder for victims of human trafficking to take
because in most cases they would not be trafficked but for economic reasons. See supra text
accompanying note 136 (describing monetary gain as a motivation for trafficking). However, being
a female is in most cases also a necessary factor in being trafficked, and would therefore satisfy the
first method of establishing a “central reason.” See supra text accompanying note 139 (noting that
the primary targets for human trafficking are females).
333. See Parussimova, 555 F.3d at 741 (“[P]ersecution may be caused by more than one central
reason, and an asylum applicant need not prove which reason was dominant.”).
334. Some authors have even proposed adding “gender” as a sixth protected ground. Siddiqui,
supra note 282, at 531. This, however, requires additional legislation, which is unnecessary under
my proposal to grant women status as a social group.
335. The U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report estimates that 800,000 people
are trafficked across international borders every year. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
336. See supra text accompanying note 138 (noting that victims are often told they or their family
members will be killed if they escape).
337. See supra notes 158–64 and accompanying text (describing efforts to reduce trafficking and
the virulence of the problem).
338. See supra text accompanying note 225.
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demonstrating that the organizations for which they were soldiers have a
history of exacting retribution on escaped soldiers.339 Such a showing may
be easier for a former child soldier to accomplish than it would for a victim
of human trafficking.340 Accordingly, a former child soldier may be more
likely to attain social group status as a “former child soldier” as he or she
would a “child in (his country of origin).”341
While the social groups of “children” and “women” face distinct
obstacles, they also have similarities. Like women, children face the
obstacle that courts are hesitant to grant social group status to groups
comprising large portions of a nation’s population, in fear of opening the
floodgates to countless cases.342 Mindful of the arguments discussed in the
preceding section supporting the notion that breadth and size are not relevant
factors to finding a social group,343 children fall under the same analysis.
While they comprise a broad group, breadth is not a factor that should be
taken into consideration when analyzing whether a group qualifies as a
social group for purposes of asylum.344 Complicating children’s situation,
however, are two distinctions between children and women that lead the
former to be less often recognized as a possible social group. The
distinctions between the groups, however, do not require such a conclusion.
One obstacle children face, unique from women, is that “youth” has
been said to not be “immutable,” one of the requirements of a social
group.345 “Youth” is said not to be immutable because children do not
remain children forever.346 This interpretation, however, misapplies the
immutability requirement. Immutability requires that the characteristic be

339. See supra notes 176–87 and accompanying text.
340. There are numerous cases approving “former child soldiers” as a social group, but cases
approving “victims of human trafficking” are lacking. See, e.g., Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157,
179–80 (3d Cir. 2003). In Lukwago, the applicant was a former child soldier who presented
evidence that the persecuting party he escaped from exacted retribution on escaped children. Id.
The applicant provided evidence that his persecutors routinely killed escaped children to punish
them or to make an example of them. Id. The court found him to have a well-founded fear of future
persecution based on his membership in the social group of former child soldiers. Id.
341. See infra notes 346–47, 351–52 and accompanying text (describing two obstacles to social
group recognition unique to children: immutability and particularity).
342. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (citing cases in which courts found that groups
comprising a large percentage of a nation’s population may not qualify as social groups).
343. See supra notes 282–334 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 283–335 and accompanying text.
345. See, e.g., Argueta-Rodriguez v. INS, No. 95-2367, slip op. at 6 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 1997)
(explaining that being a child is not an immutable characteristic).
346. Flores-Cruz v. Holder, 325 F. App’x 512, 514 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that because children
“age out” of their group, they do not satisfy the immutability requirement of a social group).
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unchangeable by will.347 Children cannot actively control the point at which
they are no longer children. Therefore, the natural evolution out of the
category of “children” does not invalidate it as a social group for reasons of
immutability.348 A refugee does not have to face a permanent threat of
persecution in order to be protected.349
Another obstacle children face that women do not in attaining social
group status is that a social group described as “children” or “youth” may
fail, for good reason, the particularity requirement. Particularity requires
that a group be defined with sufficiently specific terms to avoid
indeterminacy.350 Thus, groups defined with broad terms such as “children”
or “youth” will fail this requirement.351 However, this hurdle can easily be
avoided by defining the group with a specific age range. If an applicant
defines his social group as “children between the ages of ten and eighteen,”
or the specific range applicable to his case, he satisfies the particularity
requirement.352 The aforementioned obstacles having been minimized,
children should be able to attain status as a social group.
When a former child soldier attains social group recognition, his plight
does not end there. Following Fedorenko v. United States,353 courts have
denied asylum to applicants falling under the persecutor’s bar354 even if such

347. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996) (explaining that youth may define a
social group because that status “cannot be changed” by the applicant). Despite the fact that the
applicant in Kasinga would inevitably “age out” of her status, the BIA found youth to be a
fundamental element in defining her social group. Id.
348. Matthew D. Muller, Deborah E. Anker & Lory Diana Rosenberg, Escobar v. Gonzales: A
Backwards Step for Child Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law in Particular Social Group Asylum
Claims, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 243, 246 (2006) (“[An applicant’s] claim is not
undermined by the temporary nature of youth . . . .”). While children will eventually grow older,
their status as children is “fundamental and immutable.” Id. “It is clear from cases applying Acosta
that the temporal nature of childhood does not undermine a claim.” Id. at 246 n.12. Note also that
children are recognized by society as well as the legal system as “a ‘group’ that requires protection.”
Id. Some examples include labor and immigration laws that protect children merely because of their
youth. Id. (citing INA § 1504(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2005) (extending protection to child
domestic violence survivors)).
349. Id. at 246–47.
350. Supra notes 287–89 and accompanying text. A group is not defined with sufficient
particularity if it does not provide a benchmark to determine group membership. See supra notes
287–89 and accompanying text.
351. Flores-Cruz, 325 F. App’x at 514 (quoting Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 745
(9th Cir. 2008) (finding the social group of “Honduran street children” to be “‘too loosely defined’
to meet the particularity requirement”)).
352. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (explaining that judges who have denied social
groups for failing the particularity requirement did so because the groups’ defining terms were too
vague and thereby insufficient to distinguish group members from non-group members).
353. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
354. The persecutor’s bar to asylum states that if an applicant persecuted another, based on one of
the five protected grounds, the applicant is ineligible for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
See also supra notes 241–62 and accompanying text.
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applicants claimed that their actions were involuntary and done under the
coercion of a third party.355 While this approach may seem harsh, one
reason for such a strict application of the bar is if duress exempted a person
from the bar, any persecutor would claim his actions were involuntary.356
The Supreme Court in Fedorenko explained that if Congress had intended
the statute to include a voluntariness requirement, it would have done so
explicitly.357 Recently, however, the Supreme Court in Negusie v. Holder358
held that Fedorenko is not controlling over asylum cases because it
addressed a persecutor’s bar as applied to a different provision than that of
asylum.359 The Supreme Court’s groundbreaking decision in Negusie
invalidated almost two decades of reliance on Fedorenko.360 The Court
remanded Negusie to the BIA to determine, in the first instance, whether
motive and intent are relevant to the persecutor’s bar as applied towards
asylum.361
If the Ninth Circuit, upon hearing Negusie on remand, finds coercion to
be a relevant factor in applying the persecutor’s bar towards asylum, it will
make the case for former child soldiers much easier. Applicants will have a
chance of surpassing the persecutor’s bar by showing that they were forced
to persecute others. While opponents raise valid arguments against the
implementation of an exception to the persecutor’s bar, such analyses do not
properly apply towards children as they would for adults.362 The Ninth
Circuit should maintain that adults are subject to the persecutor’s bar
regardless of alleged coercion, but should apply a coercion exception to the
bar for children.
Proponents of a uniform application of the persecutor’s bar, regardless
of coercion, argue that even if Fedorenko addresses a different bar than that

355. See supra notes 249–53 and accompanying text.
356. See infra note 375 and accompanying text.
357. The Court concluded that Congress did not intend a voluntariness requirement for the
persecutor’s bar in section 2(a) of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA), by comparing section
2(a) with section 2(b). Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512. The Court reasoned that because section 2(b)
explicitly excludes only those individuals who voluntarily assisted the enemy forces, the omission of
the word “voluntarily” from section 2(a) was deliberate and thus the statute barred all who assisted
in the persecution of others, including those who did so under coercion. Id.
358. 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
359. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 249–53 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
362. See infra notes 386–99 and accompanying text (explaining that children require a different
analysis than adults).
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applicable to asylum, its principles are still analogous.363 Opponents of a
uniform application of the bar argue otherwise. As Justice Stevens pointed
out in his concurrence to Negusie, “We do not normally convict individuals
of crimes when their actions are coerced or otherwise involuntary.”364 He
then noted that the other nations that are signatories of the Convention “read
the Convention’s [persecutor’s bar] as limited to culpable conduct.”365
Justice Stevens’ third suggestion was that “an alien’s lack of knowledge that
he was involved in a persecutory act could likewise indicate that he did not
act with the requisite culpability.”366 Because Justice Stevens’ three-fold
argument fails on each count,367 the BIA should determine coercion is not
relevant to adults when hearing this case on appeal. However, because
children must be held to a different standard as adults, coercion should be
relevant in determining whether to apply the persecutor’s bar towards
them.368
Justice Stevens’s first argument, comparing the denial of asylum to a
conviction of a crime, fails because, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his
concurrence with Negusie, “this is not a criminal matter.”369 Justice Scalia
continued to explain that asylum is a benefit, not an entitlement, and
“withholding that benefit from all who have intentionally harmed others—
whether under coercion or not—is not unreasonable.”370 Furthermore,
Justice Stevens’s explanation of other nations’ implementation of the
persecutor’s bar fails to acknowledge that such practices are not binding on
our law.371 Justice Stevens’s last argument—that an applicant’s lack of
knowledge that he is inflicting persecution indicates that he did not act with
culpability—neglects to acknowledge Justice Scalia’s suggestion, that “there

363. See infra note 378 (explaining that Justice Thomas’s explanation that the circumstances
surrounding the implementation of the DPA, which Fedorenko analyzed, are comparable to those
that the asylum persecutor’s bar was meant to address).
364. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1175 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
continued that interpretations of the Convention reflect that “all relevant factors, including
‘mitigating circumstances,’ must be considered in determining whether an alien’s acts are of a
‘criminal nature.’” Id. The Justice fails to acknowledge that neither the Convention, nor its
interpretation by international committees, are binding on U.S. law as the Convention is not a selfexecuting treaty. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
365. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1175 (Stevens, J., concurring). Seemingly conceding that the laws of
other nations are not binding on the United States, Justice Stevens suggests that “[w]hen we interpret
treaties, we consider the interpretations of the courts of other nations, and we should do the same
when Congress asks us to interpret a statute in light of a treaty’s language.” Id.
366. Id. at 1175 n.8.
367. See infra notes 369–74 and accompanying text.
368. See infra notes 385–90 and accompanying text.
369. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1169 (Scalia, J., concurring). “This Court has long understood that an
‘order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.’” Id. (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893)).
370. Id.
371. See supra note 364.
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is no reason why the agency cannot consider questions of knowledge
separate and apart from questions of duress.”372 Justice Scalia added that, in
considering whether to grant an alien citizenship status, “culpability” is only
one facet of the more general consideration of “desirability.”373 He noted
reasons why those who persecuted others, even under coercion, would be
undesirable citizens.374
An important reason not to exempt involuntary actions from the
persecutor’s bar as applied to adults is that doing so may cause many
applicants subject to the bar to fraudulently claim their actions were
involuntary.375 One counterargument may be that while many applicants
may fraudulently claim to have been coerced, not all of them will be able to
prove so. If it were conceivable that applicants who were actually coerced
had access to evidentiary support that a fraudulent applicant would not, then
the opposition’s argument would prevail. However, it is improbable that any
applicant would have evidence to support his claim of coercion other than
his own testimony, coupled with reports describing general country
conditions.376 In theory, the opponents represent the best-case scenario:
denying asylum to those who voluntarily persecuted others while granting
asylum to those who did so under true coercion. In reality, however, there is
no pragmatic way to differentiate between the two.377 In addition to Justice

372. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., concurring).
373. Id. at 1169.
374. Id. One example posed is the suggestion that it would be imprudent to grant entry both to an
applicant who, under duress, inflicted persecution upon somebody, as well as his victim who
suffered the persecution. Id. “The Nation has a legitimate interest in preventing the importation of
ethnic strife from remote parts of the world, and the agency may resolve the statutory ambiguity in a
way that safeguards that interest.” Id.
375. Justice Scalia explained that “the cost of error (viz., allowing un coerced persecutors to
remain in the country permanently) might reasonably be viewed by the agency as significantly
greater than the cost of overinclusion under a bright-line rule (viz., denial of asylum to some coerced
persecutors . . . ).” Id. at 1170.
376. Highlighting this evidentiary issue, Justice Scalia pointed out that:
Immigration judges already face the overwhelming task of attempting to recreate, by a
limited number of witnesses speaking through (often poor-quality) translation, events that
took place years ago in foreign, usually impoverished countries. . . . Adding on top of that
the burden of adjudicating claims of duress and coercion, which are extremely difficult to
corroborate and necessarily pose questions of degree that require intensely fact-bound
line-drawing, would increase the already inherently high risk of error.
Id. at 1169–70.
377. In addition to evidentiary boundaries posing a problem to drawing a line between culpable
conduct and conduct done under duress, Justice Scalia explained that culpability “has always been a
subject of intense debate, raising profound questions of moral philosophy and individual
responsibility,” highlighting the “Nuremberg defense” as an example. Id. at 1169. Justice Scalia
also pointed out that “[a]t common law, duress was not an accepted defense to intentional killing . . .
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Scalia’s arguments, Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion to Negusie,
explaining that “the INA unambiguously precludes any inquiry into whether
the persecutor acted voluntarily, i.e., free from coercion or duress . . . .”378
Further strengthening Justice Thomas’s case is that an applicant who is
denied asylum and withholding of removal due to the persecutor’s bar has
not exhausted all options. If an applicant can prove that, more likely than
not, the applicant would be tortured upon return to the home country, the
applicant may be granted CAT relief.379 The persecutor’s bar does not
exclude an applicant from attaining protection under CAT.380
An alternative to these two approaches—examining duress or excluding
it from the analysis—would be to balance the harm done by the applicants
against the threat or level of duress imposed on them. For example, if
applicants were told that their families would be tortured if they failed to
follow instructions, and the applicants had reason to believe their captors
would follow through with their threat, the applicants would have a high
level of duress. If the applicants’ instructions were to notify their captors
when victims attempted to escape, a court may deem that their actions
amounted to persecution because they played a central role in the

and in modern times, some states do not allow it as a defense to lesser crimes.” Id. (citation
omitted). Justice Scalia also finds it noteworthy that “there is no historical support for the duress
defense when a soldier follows a military order he knows to be unlawful.” Id.
378. Id. at 1176 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas began his dissent by dissecting the
dictionary definitions of the terms “persecution,” “assist,” and “participate.” Id. at 1179 (concluding
that the assistance of and participation in persecution does not require that such actions be
voluntary). He then reverted to the analysis of statutory construction explained in Fedorenko, such
that Congress has evidenced the ability to include a voluntariness requirement, and that its choice to
exclude one in the persecutor’s bar renders it clear to have not been intended. Id. at 1179–80. See
also supra note 357 and accompanying text (describing the statutory construction analysis employed
by Fedorenko). Justice Thomas then pointed out, as Justice Scalia did, that applicants barred from
asylum may still qualify for other relief such as CAT relief. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1180 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas explained that the majority erred in finding the persecutor’s bar statute
to be ambiguous because it failed to apply the “‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ . . . before
retreating to ambiguity.” Id. at 1183. Justice Thomas concludes by criticizing the majority for
distinguishing the statute in Fedorenko from the statute applicable to asylum. Id. at 1185. The
majority concluded that the statute in Fedorenko was distinguishable from the INA bar because it
was enacted to address the crimes against humanity committed during World War II, which were so
horrific that they constitute a different scenario. Id. The majority reasoned that its unique context is
what required the barring of “even those involved in nonculpable, involuntary assistance in Nazi
persecution.” Id. Justice Thomas pointed out that it is erroneous to conclude that “all acts of
persecution during the Second World War were inherently more depraved or reprehensible than all
acts of persecution that have occurred in the decades since the INA’s enactment.” Id. Because,
Justice Thomas explained, “Congress has steadfastly condemned all acts of persecution,” the same
standard set forth in Fedorenko is applicable to the persecutor’s bar at hand. Id.
379. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 256–57 (describing a case in which an applicant was denied asylum due to
the persecutor’s bar but was granted CAT relief).
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persecution of those prisoners.381 The court, however, may take into
consideration whether the applicants only reported the prisoners if they
suspected their supervisors would otherwise find out and punish their
families. The court may also consider whether the applicants had
opportunities to escape, but chose not to.382 Lastly, the court may weigh the
harm done to the third party victims. It will be relevant whether the
hypothetical applicants reported a prisoner while knowing that the prisoner
would subsequently be tortured, or knowing that the prisoner would get a
slap on the wrist. While such a balancing test seems promising, such an
analysis requires excessive information, the evidence for which will virtually
always be little more than the applicant’s own testimony. Absent a unique
source of evidence, this leads us to the same conclusion above, that
voluntariness should not be a factor in applying the persecutor’s bar.383
The synthesis between the notions of weighing and disregarding
coercion is to consider it only for those most vulnerable to manipulation:
children.384 While voluntariness should not be a requirement to apply the
persecutor’s bar to adults, it should be required to apply the persecutor’s bar
to children. It is well-recognized that children are cognitively less
developed than adults and that they require a specialized standard for many
regulations.385 “Regardless of what acts a child commits . . . the United
States should treat [children] presumptively as victims over perpetrators.”386
In addition to being cognitively different from adults, escaped child soldiers
who have arrived in the United States are usually “unrepresented and
unaccompanied minors in a country that is foreign to them.”387 Scholars

381. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (explaining the analysis a court must partake in
to determine whether an applicant’s assistance to persecution was material).
382. This analysis would not be proper if applied towards children because children are reliant on
the help of adults and would likely have no means of support if escaped from their only source of
food and shelter. See supra notes 384–99 and accompanying text (describing that children require a
unique analysis).
383. See supra notes 370–81 and accompanying text.
384. See infra notes 386–99 and accompanying text (describing children’s vulnerabilities due to
their underdeveloped cognitive skills).
385. See infra notes 386–400 and accompanying text (describing that children require a unique
analysis). The need to hold children to a different standard than adults is also reflected by the
difference between the juvenile delinquency system and adult correctional system. Note also that
Congress has recognized the special circumstances surrounding the use of child soldiers with the
passage of the Child Soldiers Accountability Act. Cepernich, supra note 153, at 1101.
386. Cepernich, supra note 153, at 1099 (citing Christopher L. Dore, Comment, What to Do with
Omar Khadr? Putting a Child Soldier on Trial: Questions of International Law, Juvenile Justice,
and Moral Culpability, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1281, 1319–20 (2008)).
387. Id. at 1114.
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have specifically noted that United States asylum law should be adjusted to
provide more protection to former child soldiers.388 Commentators have
suggested that judges should apply a duress exception to former child
soldiers, or in the alternative, that the United States should implement a
statutory exception from the persecutor’s bar for children through a
legislative amendment of the INA.389 The United States has committed to
take “all feasible measures to . . . accord to [former child soldiers] all
appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and
their social reintegration.”390 The United Nations has expressed concern that
the United States has failed to completely abide by several provisions of this
protocol.391 Among the concerns was that the United States asylum
processes for former child soldiers was flawed.392 The UN and the
American Civil Liberties Union Human Rights Program consequently set
forth recommendations for the United States to come into compliance with
the protocol.393 The UN noted that the provisions barring child soldiers from
attaining asylum were intended to bar those who have recruited and
victimized the child soldiers, not to bar the children themselves.394
Recognizing this contrary effect, the UN recommended that the United
States “provide protection for asylum-seeking and refugee children arriving
to the United States . . . who may have been recruited or used in hostilities
abroad.”395 Children are recruited to be soldiers because of “their relative
inability to resist authority” and because “they seldom have alternatives to
remaining loyal to their exploitive superiors.”396 Abductors exploit these
characteristics and make children feel that they have no alternative but to
follow their orders.397 Due to the unique impressionable state of a child’s

388. Id. at 1113 (noting that the current level of protection is inadequate). See also, e.g., Rachel
Bien, Note, Nothing to Declare but Their Childhood: Reforming U.S. Asylum Law to Protect the
Rights of Children, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 797 (2004) (suggesting a different legal standard for children
and adults seeking asylum); Mary-Hunter Morris, Note, Babies and Bathwater: Seeking an
Appropriate Standard of Review for the Asylum Applications of Former Child Soldiers, 21 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 281 (2008) (arguing that child soldiers seeking asylum should be held to a standard less
stringent than adults because of duress); Benjamin Ruesch, Comment, Open the Golden Door:
Practical Solutions for Child-Soldiers Seeking Asylum in the United States, 29 U. LA VERNE L. REV.
184 (2008) (advocating for statutory change based on the infancy and duress exceptions).
389. Cepernich, supra note 153, at 1099–101.
390. Id. at 1100.
391. Id. at 1108. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child is responsible for
supervising nations’ compliance with the Optional Protocol. Id.
392. Id. at 1109.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 1114.
395. Id. at 1110.
396. Id. at 1115.
397. Id.
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mind, commonly exacerbated by orphanage,398 children should be exempt
from the persecutor’s bar if their actions were done under coercion. As is
the case for the social group analyses of “women” and “children,” the impact
of failing to correct the analysis of the persecutor’s bar may have farreaching ramifications.399
VII. THE FORECASTED IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSALS SET
FORTH BY THIS COMMENT
International agencies have expressed grave concern over the issue of
human trafficking.400 Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan
described human trafficking as “one of the most egregious violations of
human rights which the United Nations now confronts.”401 Human
trafficking has also often been pointed out as a serious problem by top
members of United States presidential administrations.402 In 2006, President
George W. Bush announced the mission “to fight and end this modern form
of slavery . . . .”403 Former Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated that
“America will . . . promote programs to protect [women refugees] from
Former Secretary of State
sexual and gender-based violence.”404
Condoleezza Rice pledged that the State Department will “work with
international partners to secure the freedom of those who are
exploited . . . .”405 International agencies have taken concrete steps to ensure
that the refugee arena reflects the concern with trafficking of women.406
Most noteworthy is that former Attorney General Janet Reno set forth
regulations that “would establish that women may comprise a social
group.”407 The DHS, however, has failed to issue these regulations and they
remain pending.408 Other nations have implemented asylum regulations that

398. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text (describing that orphans are a common
target for recruiters of child soldiers).
399. See infra Part VII.
400. Knight, supra note 96, at 2.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 3.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Marisa A. DeFranco, Gender Asylum: Bringing the Law into the 21st Century, 12 MASS. B.
ASS’N SECTION REV. 1, 15 (2010), available at http://www.massbar.org/media/717503/
sr%20v12%20n1%20final.pdf.
408. Id.
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afford trafficked women such protection.409 It is therefore astonishing to
note the incongruence between the words expressing commitment to protect
victims of human trafficking and the failure of the government to do so.
While some victims of human trafficking have been granted asylum,
reported decisions are heavily weighted toward denials.410 These decisions
demonstrate a firm resistance to providing asylum to victims of even the
most severe levels of harm.411 While other forms of relief for victims of
human trafficking exist, they are gravely inadequate to address many
deserving victims.412
The use of child soldiers is also a rampant problem raising grave
humanitarian issues. Armed forces recruit children and train them to
commit horrific acts.413 Child soldiers are forced to engage in hazardous
activities and live under harsh conditions with insufficient food and little or
no access to medical care.414 Children are often told that if they do not
follow instructions, they and their parents will be killed.415 The United
States and forty-four other countries have recognized the prevalence of child
recruitment and have dedicated themselves to bringing an end to the use of
child soldiers.416 Nevertheless, within the past decade, hundreds of
thousands of children have been killed while fighting in conflicts around the
world.417
This Comment has proposed three suggestions for improving United
States asylum law as applied to victims of human trafficking and former
child soldiers. One proposal is for courts to acknowledge “women” as a
social group.418 Another suggestion is for courts to allow “youth” to define a
social group, provided a specified age range.419 Lastly, when the BIA hears
Negusie on remand, it should find that the provisions of Fedorenko are
applicable to asylum law, such that voluntariness should not be relevant to
the persecutor’s bar as applied to adults, but should be a factor when applied
to children.420 The impact of implementing these proposals not only may
change the lives of refugees seeking protection from persecution, but may
also have farther-reaching effects.
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While critics have suggested that the repercussions of allowing gender
as a social group may open the floodgates to countless claims, including
fraudulent ones, a firm understanding of asylum law and international
examples prove that this would not happen.421 Rather, only the women who
can actually show to have suffered past persecution, or can show a wellfounded fear of future persecution, would be granted asylum.422 By
establishing women as a proper social group, courts would be able to grant
asylum to these victims, thereby alleviating a portion of severe persecution
suffered throughout the world. Every minute that courts hesitate in granting
women social group status, women in dire need of protection are denied a
basic human right: safety from persecution.423 While implementing the
above suggestions may only directly affect a few people, the United States
may serve as a leader, after which nations who do not yet have such
provisions may follow. By helping change this international standard, the
United States may effectively assist victims of human trafficking applying
for asylum in countries around the globe. Allowing women to constitute a
social group may also open the door for other broad groups facing
persecution who are currently denied social group status, such as men and
children.424 Most importantly, granting asylum to these victims may
encourage them to provide information about their traffickers to the
government. Victims may be apprehensive to speak out against their
traffickers due to the fear of reprisals if returned to their country. If a victim
is granted asylum, she rests assured that she will not be sent back to her
country and may be more comfortable helping the government stop her
traffickers.425 Helping the government locate sources of human trafficking
allows the United States to work towards eliminating the problem
altogether.426
If courts recognize that “youth” qualifies as a characteristic to define a
social group, provided a specified age range is supplied, the lives of
countless children who risk persecution if returned to their countries may be
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spared. As with allowing gender as a qualifying characteristic, allowing
“youth” may set such a standard for other nations to follow, affording
benefits to an even larger amount of children. Furthermore, the fewer
children that are sent back to countries utilizing them as soldiers, the fewer
pawns those forces will have for inflicting persecution on third parties,
possibly saving the lives of those third party civilians.
Paralleling the benefits of granting social group status to women, doing
so for children may afford them the protection needed for them to speak out
against their persecutors. This may allow the U.S. government to track
down forces improperly using children as soldiers. The repercussions of
diminishing the use of child soldiers will affect the lives of the children who
would be persecuted, as well as the safety of the civilians upon which the
children may have been forced to inflict injury.
Negusie currently awaits rehearing by the BIA to determine whether the
persecutor’s bar applies to asylum applicants regardless of whether their
actions were coerced.427 If the BIA holds that the persecutor’s bar still
applies to asylum cases regardless of whether an applicant’s actions were
voluntary, with the exception of children, it will produce a more positive
outcome than if the persecutor’s bar applied only to applicants whose actions
were voluntary.428 If Negusie on remand holds the persecutor’s bar applies
only to voluntary persecution, many applicants who persecuted others, even
voluntarily, may be granted asylum.429 While this may help applicants who
genuinely were coerced into their actions, the potential benefit for those few
is outweighed by the ramifications of granting asylum to those who
voluntarily persecuted others.430 If people in other countries learn that they
may be granted asylum in the United States despite persecuting others, they
may have less inhibitions when confronted with a decision of whether to
inflict persecution on others. In addition, having engaged in persecution
abroad, these applicants would pose a threat to the safety of citizens in the
United States.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Julia and Amare, the hypothetical victim of human trafficking and the
hypothetical former child soldier presented in the introduction, would likely
be sent back to the countries in which they endured persecution. This is
because their respective social groups of “women” and “children” may be

427.
428.
429.
430.

480

See supra text accompanying note 361.
See supra notes 365–81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
See supra note 375 and accompanying text.

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 423, 2012]

2/8/2012 3:19 PM

Seeking Asylum
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

erroneously denied due to their breadth in certain circuits.431 Amare may
also be denied asylum due to the persecutor’s bar.432
Despite the unfortunate prevalence of human trafficking433 and the use
of child soldiers,434 there is a void of effective regulations and asylum
provisions to address these problems.435 Implementing the above proposals
should ameliorate the suffering of victims of human trafficking, minimize
the harm inherent in the use of child soldiers, as well as help prevent further
occurrences of these travesties.436
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